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INTRODUCTION

In the business world context today, more and more contracts are formed without the
traditional “bargaining” to reach an agreement. Instead, business negotiation is surrounded by
rules, principles, and mostly trade usages. This is called the lex mercatoria (or law merchant),
which was originally a body of principles and rules relating to merchants and mercantile
transactions in both legal systems. These customs date back many years, but still exist today in
the form of usages applied in commercial transactions. In fact, in almost every kind of business,
merchants themselves established these rules to regulate their dealings.
Furthermore, the parties have the responsibility during the negotiation period to abide by
the applicable the usages no matter the context. The bargaining period involves potential precontractual liability for the parties in both American law and French law. Even if these two
systems are different by their basic structure -common law system and civil law- they reach
similar results at the end. In both legal systems, there is no strict rule, but there are some
principles that the parties have to follow and respect. Even if a final agreement is not reached,
sometimes the parties may still be liable even in absence of a written contract or agreement.
This period of negotiation involves risk for the respective parties until an agreement is
signed. Indeed, the term negotiation or “to negotiate” can be defined as:
[T]o transact business, to bargain with another respecting a transaction; to conduct
communications or conferences with a view to reaching a settlement or agreement. It
is that which passes between the parties or their agents in the course of or incident to
the making of a contract and is also conversation in arranging terms of contract.1

1

BLACK’S DICTIONARY 1036 (7TH ED. 1999)
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In addition, according to the court in Al Herd, Inc. v. Isaac2, the term “to negotiate” is “to
communicate or confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter.”3 It is also
“to meet with another so as to arrive through discussion at some kind of agreement or
compromise about something.”4 It is important to bear in mind that the ultimate aim of
negotiation is to reach an agreement between the parties, creating a binding contract which
generates obligations for both of them, and sometimes for third parties. During this period, the
parties are free to negotiate but also to withdraw at will. Nevertheless, if the parties can terminate
at will, they have to do so in good faith. Although obligations between parties are recognized by
the legal community when a contract is signed, the obligations during the period of negotiations
are difficult to determine. The issue of whether preliminary negotiations are binding between the
parties depends upon different factors such as the type of documents and the surrounding
circumstances.
The aim of this comparative study is to examine how both American law and French law
systems are dealing with pre-contractual obligations between the parties at the negotiation stage.
This paper will also define and identify the obligations between the parties during this
negotiation period. Pre-contractual obligations will be analyzed mostly among commercial
contracts and consumer contracts.
In part one, this study will analyze how liability may be incurred before there is mutual
assent. It will focus on the situation where one party is held liable for misrepresentation or failure
to disclose some important and relevant information to the other party. It will define the term
“contract” and what should be understood by “binding agreement.” The most important

2

76 Cal. Rptr. 697 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1969)
Id. at 700
4
Id. at 700
3
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remaining issues are whether the intent to contract exists between the parties and whether there is
manifestation of assent.
Furthermore, this study will explain the different and important elements required to
constitute a valid and binding contract. American law and French law do not require the same
elements. Whereas French law focuses on the cause of the contract and the subject matter,
American law concentrates on whether the agreement is supported by valid consideration.
Part one will also focus on the notion of caveat emptor and its exceptions: duty to
disclose, duty of care, misrepresentation and misrepresentation by silence. Under this doctrine of
caveat emptor, one party cannot recover damages because of his or her lack of awareness at the
time of the negotiation or even later on when the contract was formed. However, despite the
parties may have some legal duties such as the duty to disclose and the duty of care.
Misrepresentation, whether by fraud or by silence, can happen during this negotiation period.
Some procedural problems may arise when trying to prove misrepresentation or the duty to
disclose. These are also discussed in part one. Indeed, the negotiation period can be protected by
the effect of the parol evidence rule. It seeks to preserve the integrity of written contracts by
refusing to contradict the oral declarations of contracting parties. To protect themselves, the
parties may want to include a merger clause in their final agreement to enclose the previous
dealings. A merger clause is a provision where the parties indicate their intention that their
writing was intended to be final and complete.5
In the second part, this study will focus on the liability when a preliminary or tentative
agreement is made, but a formal agreement is only contemplated (but never executed). Indeed,
whether an agreement is reached at the end of the negotiation process, preliminary negotiations
5

MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, Fourth Edition, 2001: THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE – “INCONSISTENT” AND
“CONTRADICTORY” – FORM OF WRITING – THE MEANING OF “INTEGRATION” § 83, 432.
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in themselves do not constitute a contract. The parties may draft a contract early in the stage of
negotiation with a condition precedent called “condition suspensive” in French law, in which at
realization of a condition, the contract will be formed. Moreover, the parties can include some
essential terms in their contract on which the parties agreed. In order to hold a contract
enforceable, the essential terms of agreement have to be certain enough to provide a substantial
basis for providing an appropriate remedy.6 The parties also may want to have an agreement to
reduce the contract to writing or to make it more formal. Here again, by using legal tools, the
parties try to protect their interests during the delicate period of negotiations. It is important to
note that French law, especially French Civil Code, does not have provisions which directly deal
with the negotiation period.
The second part of this paper will also compare the system of letters of intent in both
American law and French law.

The parties may want to use this type of document to

memorialize a basic agreement and to identify any potential deal breaking issues early in the
negotiating process.7 This is a possibility for the parties to regulate this period of risks - the
negotiation period. The main legal issue arising from letters of intent is whether there is a
binding agreement. This second part will analyze the legal nature of this pre-contractual writing
and distinguish it from other legal documents. Here again, the parties may be bound by the duty
to negotiate in good faith and fair dealing. In addition, the acts and words of the parties have a
direct effect on their legal situation.

6

Linnet v. Hitchcock, 471 A.2d 537 (1984) at 214, the court indicates that “ an agreement is an enforceable contract
wherein the parties intended to conclude a binding agreement and the essential terms of that agreement are certain
enough to provide the basis for providing an appropriate remedy.” The court refers to Lombrado v. Gasparini
Excavating Co., 123 A.2d 663 (1956); Yellow Coal Co. v. Alma Elly-YV Mines, 426 A.2d 1152 (1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981) comment a, b.
7
KATHRYN COCHRANE MURPHY, LETTER OF INTENT, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE – AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION ALI-ABA COURSE OF STURY, 2003 (SH008 ALI-ABA 387).

4

The third and final part will analyze two legal doctrines in American law: the theory of
promissory estoppel and the doctrine of unjust enrichment. It will determine their respective
relations with pre-contractual obligations and their effects on the negotiation process. Promissory
estoppel provides one party a remedy when the other changes his mind to the injury of the
former. Even if no contract has been signed between the parties, one party can still make a claim
for promissory estoppel if some elements are met: a clear and unambiguous promise, a reliance
by the party to whom the promise is made, and an injury to the party as a result of this reliance.
In French law, such a theory does not exist. However, a similar doctrine might have the same
effects the “théorie de l’apparence.”8 In addition, the injured party can make a claim under the
unjust enrichment theory or “enrichissement sans cause.” This doctrine prohibits one party to
from keeping benefits through the other party’s loss. It is a non-contractual liability based on the
theory of restitution. In French law, this involves tort law or “responsabilité délictuelle” rather
than contract law.

8

It can be translated as “theory of appearance.”
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CHAPTER I

LIABILITY FOR MISREPRESENTATION OR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
INFORMATION

I- Formation of contract and preliminary negotiations
Before analyzing the notion of preliminary negotiations, it is important to define the term
“contract” and how a valid contract is formed. A contract can be defined as “an agreement
between two or more persons which creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing.”9
Moreover, the Restatement Second of Contracts defines a contract as “a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in
some way recognized as a duty.”10 The court in Lamoureux v. Burrillville Racing Ass’n11
indicates that this is “a legal relationship consisting of the rights and duties of the contracting
parties; a promise or set of promises constituting an agreement between the parties that gives
each a legal duty to the other and also the right to seek a remedy for the breach of those duties.
Its essentials are competent parties, subject matter, a legal consideration, mutuality of agreement,
and mutuality of obligation.”12 Under the U.C.C., the term “contract” refers to a legal obligation

9

BLACK’S DICTIONARY 322 (7th ed. 1999)
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1
11
161 A.2d 213 (1960).
12
Id. at 6
10
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which results from an agreement between the parties as affected by the Code Section 1201(12).13
In addition, as to sales of goods, under U.C.C. Section 2-106(1) the terms “contract for
sale” includes “both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time”14 as
well, whereas the terms “agreement” and “contract” are only limited to those relating to present
or future sales of goods.15 Plus, this is “the writing which contains the agreement of parties, with
the terms and conditions, and which serves as a proof of the obligation.”16
Accordingly, pre-contractual documents and therefore preliminary negotiations differ from final
contracts in their nature and elements. Indeed, to have a legally binding agreement in both
American and French law, several requirements and elements have to be fulfilled.
First of all, in American law, a contract must be supported by valid consideration.
According to the court in an early case, Hardesty v. Smith,17 consideration is described as
follows:
The doing of an act by one at the request of another, which may be a detriment or
inconvenience, however slight, to the party doing it, or may be a benefit, however
slight, to the party at whose request it is performed, is a legal consideration for a
promise by such requesting party. So the parting with a right, which one possesses, to
another, at his request, may constitute a good consideration.18

The doctrine of consideration and its importance has been affirmed and still is recognized
by the courts.19 Restatement First of Contracts §75 (1932) defines consideration as “an act other

13

U.C.C. §1-201(12) “‘contracts’, as distinguished from “agreement”, means the total legal obligation that results
from the parties’ agreement as determined by [the Uniform Commercial Code] as supplemented by any other
applicable laws.”
14
U.C.C. §2-106(1)
15
U.C.C. §2-106(1). See the Vienna Convention on International sale of goods (CISG), 1980 which includes the
contract to sell goods at a future time.
16
191 A.2d 213 at 215 (1960).
17
3 N.E.2d 39 (1851).
18
Id. See for a definition of consideration: Curry v. Estate of Thompson, 481 A.2d 658 at 661 (1984) Consideration
“confers a benefit upon the promisor or causes a detriment to the promise and must be an act, forbearance of return
promise bargained for and given in exchange for the original promise.”
19
Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94. (1919).

7

than a promise, or (b) a forbearance, or (c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal
relation, or (d) a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the promise…” Under
the Restatement Second of Contracts §71 (1978) “(1) To constitute consideration, a performance
or a return promise must be bargained for; (2) A performance or return promise is bargained for
if it sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in
exchange for that promise; (3) The performance may consist of (a) an act other than a promise,
or (b) a forbearance, or (c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation; (4) The
performance or return promise may be given to the promisor or to some other person. It may be
given by the promisee or by some other person.”
The second element is the intent to enter into a contract. A contract will be formed and
enforceable only if the parties intended to enter into one. It is the manifestation of a party’s
intention which counts, not the inner intention. The manifestation of mutual assent is therefore
important and necessary to constitute a valid contract.20 In fact, the intent of one party to enter
into an agreement must be known by the other party (or at least reasonably apparent) in order for
the agreement to be valid and enforceable at law.21
Moreover, the nature of assent is very important in the formation of contracts. The court
in Embry v. Hargadin, McKittrick Dry Goods Co.22 specifies that a contract is formed when
there is the manifestation of intention of the parties. Accordingly, there is an agreement between
the parties when they agreed on the same terms of their contract.23 Further, in Hotchkiss v.

20

Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954).
Butler v. Moses, 1 N.E. 316 (1885).
22
105 S.W. 777 (1907).
23
Id .at 778 in this case only an oral contract was involved. The court asserts that to constitute a contract “there must
be a meeting of the minds of the parties, and both must agree to the same thing in the same sense… the inner
intention of parties to a conversation subsequently alleged to create a contract cannot either make a contract of what
transpired, or prevent one from arising, if the words used were sufficient to constitute a contract… it is only such
intention as the words or acts of the parties indicate; not one secretly cherished which is inconsistent with those
words or acts.”
21

8

National City Bank of New York24 the court indicates that the inner intent does not count but
only express intent does.25 In Lucy v. Zehmer,26 the court cites the importance of taking into
account the outward expression of the intent.27
However, in some situations, the parties do not seem to agree about some elements of the
contract (present or future) but they misunderstand each other. If there is a basic
misunderstanding, no contract or agreement can be reached by the parties because there is no
manifestation of mutual assent. The Restatement Second of Contracts regulates the situation of
misunderstanding.28 A particular decision, Cargill Commission Co. v. Mowery,29 illustrates this
situation and therefore emphasizes the importance of words in contracts.30
The third element of a contract is the offer. A contract is constituted by an offer and an
acceptance. An offer is defines as “an expression by one party of his assent to certain definite
terms, provided that the other party involved in the bargaining transaction will likewise express
his assent to the identically same terms.”31 The court in Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus
Store, Inc.32 indicates that an offer has to be definite, clear, and explicit. It has to leave nothing

24

200 Fed. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
Id. at 293
26
84 S.E. 2d 516 (1954).
27
Id. at 521 the court indicates that “we must look to the outward expression of a person as manifesting his intention
rather than to his secret and unexpressed intention.” According to First Nat. Exchange Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke
Oil Co., 192 S.E. 794 at 770 (1937) the court states that “the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to
the reasonable meaning of his words and acts.”
28
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: EFFECT OF MISUNDERSTANDING §20 “(1) There is no manifestation of
mutual assent to an exchange if the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations and (a)
neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached by the other; or (b) each party knows or each party
has reason to know the meaning attached by the other. (2) The manifestations of the parties are operative in
accordance with the meaning attached to them by one of the parties if (a) that party does not knows of any different
meaning attached by the other, and the other knows the meaning attached by the first party, or (b) that party has no
reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other has reason to know the meaning
attached by the first party.”
29
161 P. 634 (1916)
30
Id. In this case a mistake was made regarding the amount of goods. See also Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 Hurlstone &
Coltman 906 (Court of Exchequer, 1864).
31
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §11 at 22 (1963), 403, in ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND
RELATED OBLIGATIONS: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE, Fourth Edition 2001.
32
86 N.W. 2d 689 (1957).
25
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open for negotiation.33 Thus, it constitutes an offer, acceptance of which will complete the
contract.34
Accordingly, an offer must be followed by an acceptance. Acceptance is the fourth
element of a valid agreement. The acceptance is a voluntary act of the offeree whereby he
exercises the power conferred upon him by the offer, and thereby creates the set of legal relations
called a contract.35 The court in Ardente v. Horan36 indicates that “to be effective, an acceptance
must be definite and unequivocal.”37 Further, acceptance should not add some conditions or
limitation on the offer. If that is the case, it will not be an acceptance but a counter-offer.38
Moreover, an acceptance has to be in the form required by the offer.39 It is important to
emphasize that silence does not usually constitute an acceptance.40 Therefore, in some cases, it is
difficult to determine whether there is a binding contract between the parties.41 Nevertheless, a

33

Id. at 691 the court refers also to Johnson v. Capital City Ford Co., 85 So. 2d 75 (1955) at 192.
See Courteen Seed Co. v. Abraham, 275 P. 684 (1929) (which emphasized the importance of the words in an
offer. The court held that “the language… did not constitute an offer of sale; that the language was general, and
such, might be used in an advertisement or circular addressed generally to those engaged in the seed business; and
that such language was not an offer by which the defendant was bound, if accepted by any or all of the persons
addressed.”)
35
COBIN, OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE, AND SOME OF THE RESULTING LEGAL RELATIONS, 26 Yale L.J. 169, 199-200
(1917) citing in ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS: THEORY,
DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE, Fourth Edition, 417.
36
366 A.2d 162 (1976)
37
Id. at 260. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONTRACTS §58, (1932) comment a “An offeror is entitled to know in clear
terms whether the offeree accepts his proposal. It is not enough that the words of a reply justify a probable inference
of assent.”
38
In Ardente, 366 A.2d 162 (1976), the court found that was the case of a counteroffer and not an acceptance. The
court asserts that “an acceptance which is equivocal or upon condition or with a limitation is a counteroffer and
requires acceptance by the original offeror before a contractual relationship can exist. However, an acceptance may
be valid despite conditional language if the acceptance is clearly independent of the condition.” Id. at 165.
39
See Eliason v. Henshaw, 17 U.S. 225 (1819), this explains that an acceptance has to be made in the manner
required and stipulated by the offer. The court states that “an acceptance communicated at a place different form that
pointed out by the buyers, and forming a part of their proposal, imposed no obligation binding upon them, unless
they had acquiesced in it, which they declined doing.”)
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-206(1)(a) “(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances (a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any
medium reasonable in the circumstances.”
40
Ducommun v. Johnson, 110 N.W. 2d 271 at 274 (1961). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS: ACCEPTANCE BY
SILENCE OR EXERCISE OF DOMINION §69 cites the cases in which the silence or inaction means acceptance.
41
Southworth v. Oliver, 581 P.2d 994 (1978) in which the question was whether there is a binding contract. The
court refers to the intention of the parties, the manifestation of this intention, the facts and the circumstances existing
34
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contract can be recognized as binding even if some terms are left open.42 Here again, it is the
intention of the parties which will determine whether the contract is binding.
French law has approximately the same concept of contract and the same elements
toward contract formation as American law. However, the concept of consideration does not
exist in the French law system. Article 1101 of the French Civil Code defines a contract as an
agreement by which one or more parties obligate themselves to one or more other parties to give,
or to do or not to do, something.43 Besides an offer and acceptance, a contract needs four
elements according to article 1108 of the French Civil Code: the consent of the party who has the
duty to perform, his or her capacity of contracting, a subject-matter or object upon which the
contract is based (a sale of goods or services), and a cause (the reason why the contract is
made).44
In addition, a contract needs to have a price.45 This element remains very important in
French law. It does not matter if the price is defined or not but at least it has to have some
elements towards its determination. The price has to be designed by the parties and included in

at the time of the document (the letter) was received and to what a reasonable person would have done (and whether
the intention was obvious to a reasonable person).
42
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-204(3) which explicitly provides that “Even though one or more terms are
left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there
is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”
43
See PAULA GILIKER, PRE-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW, 3 (Kluwer Law International,
2002) “le contrat est une convention par laquelle une ou plusieurs personnes s’obligent, envers une ou plusieurs
autres, à donner, à faire ou à ne pas faire quelque chose.”
See also Article of JOHANNA SCHMIDT, LES LETTRES D’INTENTION, [LETTERS OF INTENT] RDAI/IBLJ, Number 3/4,
2002.
44
Article 1108 C.CIV states that “Quatre conditions sont essentielles pour la validité d'une convention : le
consentement de la partie qui s'oblige; sa capacité de contracter; un objet certain qui forme la matière de
l'engagement; une cause licite dans l'obligation.”
45
Article 1591 C.CIV states that “le prix de la vente le prix de la vente doit être déterminé et désigné par les parties”
and article 1129 C.CIV cites “il faut que l'obligation ait pour objet une chose au moins déterminée quant à son
espèce. La quotité de la chose peut être incertaine, pourvu qu'elle puisse être déterminée.” which means that an
obligation must have for its object something determinate at least as to its nature.

11

the contract.46 This requirement is essential in contracts of sale. Article 1583 of the French Civil
Code requires that there must be agreement on the price and the object of the contract.47
French law requires the subjective will of the parties or “l’accord de volontés.”48
Moreover, according to article 1108 of the French Civil Code49 the consent of both parties is
required and necessary. Accordingly, the formation of a contract will depend on the subjective
will of the parties.50 Thus, in case of a suit, the courts will seek terms which both parties
objectively and subjectively agree are essential to the contract. Thus, it is more difficult to know
whether or not the agreement of the parties constitutes a valid and binding contract during the
stage of negotiation.
Because the negotiation period involves risks for both of the parties, it is important to
know what exactly their legal obligations and duties are during this pre-contractual stage.

46

Article 1591 C.CIV and Article 1129 C.CIV. See Cass. Civ, Jul. 16, 1974, D. 1974. 681 note P. Malaurie, which
indicates that the price has to be clear and adequate. Since 1978, by three important cases, the Cour de Cassation
intervenes on the grounds of article 1129 C.CIV and not on article 1591 C.CIV in order to determine whether the
price is determined or can be determined by some methods (which shall be cited in the agreement). See Cass. Com.
Oct. 11, 1978, D. 1979. 135 note R Houin; JCP 1979 II 19034 note Y Loussouarn; RTDC 1979. 129 obs Y
Loussouarn; RTDC 1980.364 obs G Cornu.
47
Article 1583 C.CIV provides that “elle est parfaite entre les parties, et la propriété est acquise de droit à l'acheteur à
l'égard du vendeur, dès qu'on est convenu de la chose et du prix, quoique la chose n'ait pas encore été livrée ni le
prix payé” which can be translated in “the sale is perfect between the parties, the ownership is transfered from the
seller to the buyer, when there is an agreement upon the thing and the price, even if the thing has not been delivered
yet and the price has not been paid.”
48
Article 1134 C.CIV indicates that “les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont
faites. Elles ne peuvent être révoquées que de leur consentement mutuel, ou pour les causes que la loi autorise. Elles
doivent être exécutées de bonne foi.”
49
Article 1108 C.CIV stipulates “le consentement de la partie qui s’oblige.”
50
See the leading case of 1978, Cass. Civ., May 2, 1978, D. 1979. 317 note J Schmidt; JCP 1980 II 19435. The
“Cour de Cassation” (superior French jurisdiction) found that a disagreement about some modalities of the payment
(dates for payment of the balance of the sale price and for possession) which were very important to the seller,
obstructed formation of the contract. It has to be concluded that the will of one party is thereby capable of rendering
an ordinary minor term vital in the context of the present agreement, although this must be stated expressly before
acceptance by the other party. See also Rep 20.1.1941 DA 1941. 179.

12

II- Ways of incurring liability before there is mutual assent
A- Caveat emptor: the general approach in the U.S.
Because the parties are free to contract or not,51 they should be liable for their acts or
forbearances. Moreover, they have to pay attention to the contract they sign, the terms cited in
this contract, and their respective obligations. In addition to the theory of freedom of contract,52
the common law brought the theory of caveat emptor. This legal maxim means “let the buyer
beware.” In sum, it implies that the buyer takes the risk regarding quality or condition of the item
purchased unless protected by warranty, or if the buyer is a victim of misrepresentation.53 As an
illustration, in Colton v. Stanford,54 the court emphasizes that “the greatest liberty of making
contracts is essential to the business interests of the country. In general, the parties must look out
for themselves.”55 In Obde v. Schlemeyer,

56

a case involving a purchase of a house in which

damages occurred because of a termite infestation, the sellers argued that the purchasers asked
no questions respecting the possibility of termites. They relied on Swinton v. Whitinsville Sav.
Bank57 in which the doctrine of caveat emptor was strictly applied. The court stated that “as
between parties dealing at arms length (as vendor and purchaser) there is no duty to speak, in the
absence of a request for information... A vendor of real property has no duty to disclose to a
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They are also free to cancel a contract. See Colton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351 at 398 (1890) “the power to cancel a
contract is a most extraordinary power. It is one which should be exercised with great caution… A too free use of
this power would render all business uncertain; … make the length of a chancellor’s foot the measure of individual
rights.”
52
This principle which do also exists in French law, refers to the fact that the parties can contract whenever they
want and they are free to do so. Therefore the contract requires the meeting of minds or “accord de volontés” of
both parties.
53
See infra 2) Duties of the parties: exceptions to caveat emptor b) Misrepresentation.
54
82 Cal. 351 (1890).
55
Id. at 398
56
353 P.2d 672 (1960). In this case the doctrine of caveat emptor was not applied and the court cites “we are
convinced that the defendant had a duty to inform the plaintiff of the termite condition.”
57
42 N.E. 2d 808 (1942).
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prospective purchaser the fact of a latent termite condition in the premises.”58 In some decisions,
courts have recognized the buyer liable under the doctrine of caveat emptor.59
However, despite its apparent force, the caveat emptor doctrine has been limited since
its origin.60 It is shown by several decisions that courts often try to protect the consumer from the
acts or words of the seller.61 In fact, sellers usually are in a stronger position than the buyer is.
Indeed, most of the time, they do not have the same bargaining power. Legislation regarding
consumer contracts aims to give strong protection to the consumer. Of course, buyers still have
to beware when purchasing a good (or a service), but sellers are confronted with more
obligations than they were in the past. Sellers sometimes have a duty to disclose and a duty of
care. Indeed, in Reed v. King,62 the court emphasized that in real estate transactions, the seller
has a duty to disclose known defects and therefore the doctrine of caveat emptor has little or no
application.63
When contracts do not involve a consumer and a seller but rather two professionals (in a
sense that they are both doing the same type of business), the doctrine of caveat emptor can be
applied and the seller has no duty to disclose. This notion of duty to disclose is discussed in the
58

Id. at 452
See e.g., Kuczmanski v. Gill, 302 S.E.2d 48 (1983); Layman v. Binns, 35 Ohio St. 3d 176 (1988); Williams v.
Neff, 43 Va. Cir. 464 (1997), Van Horn v. Peoples Banking Co., 64 Ohio App. 3d 745 (1990); Landers v. Scroggy,
294 Ky. 848 (1943); Lee v. Bowers, 31 Va. Cir. 147 (1993); Gibson v. Lambeth, 86 N.C. App. 264 (1987).
60
See article KEETON, FRAUD - CONCEALMENT AND NON-DISCLOSURE, 15 Tex. Law Review (December 1936) 1,
14-16. Professor Keeton cites “when Lord Cairns stated in Peek v. Gurney that there was no duty to disclose facts,
however morally censurable their non-disclosure may be, he was stating the law as shaped by an individualistic
philosophy based upon freedom of contract. It was not concerned with morals. In the present stage of the law, the
decisions show a drawing away from this idea, and there can be seen an attempt by many courts to reach a just result
in so far as possible, but yet maintaining the degree of certainty which the law must have. The statement may often
be found that if either party to a contract of sale conceals or suppresses a material fact which he is in good faith
bound to disclose then his silence is fraudulent.”
61
See e.g. Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672 at 674-675; Bowdring v. McKee, 57 Va. Cir. 9 at 9-10 (2001)
62
193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1983).
63
Id. at 131-132 “a seller of real property has a duty to disclose: where the seller knows of facts materially affecting
the value or desirability of the property which are known or accessible only to him and also knows that such facts
are not known to, or within the reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the seller is under a duty
to disclose them to the buyer. The ancient maxim caveat emptor, let the buyer beware, has little or no application to
California real estate transactions.” E.g. some States like Georgia have legislation regarding duty to disclose in real
estate contracts.
59

14

following section. However, a seller cannot be afforded protection under the doctrine of caveat
emptor if he or she makes false representations of material fact.64

B- Duties of parties: exceptions to caveat emptor
1) Duty to disclose
One party, usually the seller, has a duty not to mislead the other. This is called the duty to
disclose. The questions are what is the extent of this legal duty and how does a seller know when
he has fulfilled his obligation.
In American law, duty to disclose is part of the notion of misrepresentation. According to
Professor Murray, “the notion that one party has a duty to disclose relevant information to the
other party who has equal access to such information appeared antithetical to courts holding
traditional views of individuality and bargaining.”65 This legal duty is therefore more important
in pre-contractual relations between the parties. In order to contract, a party has to know all (or
almost) the information and relevant material facts about the agreement the parties will reach.
For example, in Bates v. Cashman,66 a case regarding the purchase of stocks and bonds of a
company, the buyer would not have signed the contract if he had known that the seller’s
statement during the negotiations preceding the contract did not correspond to reality. The buyer
has the possibility to rescind a contract if the seller failed to disclose important and relevant
material facts or if the seller misrepresented the facts.67
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E.g. Bowdring v. McKee, 57 Va. Cir. 9. (2001); Jacobs v. Racevskis, 663 N.E.2d 653 (1995); Lepera v. Fuson,
613 N.E.2d 1060 (1992); Grigsby v. Stapleton, 7 S.W. 421 (1887).
65
MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, Fourth Edition, 2001: MISREPRESENTATION §95, 536.
66
119 N.E. 663 (1918).
67
Id. 119 N.E. 663 at 663 (1918) “the defendant relied upon it and would not have signed the contract if he had
known that it was false. A person seasonably rescind a contract to which he has been induced to become a party in
reliance upon false though innocent misrepresentations respecting a cognizable material fact made as of his own
knowledge by the other party to the contract.”
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Nowadays, courts analyze non-disclosure as misrepresentation regarding its legal effects.
For example, in a case dealing with the purchase of a house infested with termites, and the seller
knew this fact and failed to disclose it to the buyer, even though the contract contained a
disclaimer clause, the court stated that “a provision in such a contract, to the effect that the agent
cannot bind the company by any representations, statements or agreements, will not relieve the
principal from responsibility for the fraudulent representations, made by its agents, concerning
the subject-matter of the contract . . . for a sales agent has ostensible authority to make
representations as to the subject-matter of the sale, and his fraud, committed within the limits of
such authority, will fix responsibility upon his principal.”68 Here again, this is an important
material fact that the buyer of a house should know, especially during the negotiation process. A
situation of non-disclosure is legally similar to disclosing a fraudulent fact. Indeed,
misrepresentation can be either by fraud or by silence. Silence fraud occurs when the defendant
fails to disclose some information to the plaintiff. In order to establish this, the plaintiff has to
prove five elements. First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant failed to disclose some
material fact about the subject matter of the claim; second, that the defendant knew these
material facts; third, that there was a causal link between the defendant’s failure to disclose the
facts and the plaintiff having a false impression (and moreover that the defendant knew the
failure would create a false impression); fourth, that the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely
on the resulting false impression and he effectively relied on this false impression; and finally, a
damage occurred as a result of the reliance on the false impression.69 For example, in Swinton v.
Whitinsville Savings Bank,
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a case dealing with concealment of a termite infestation in the
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Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc, 518 N.W.2d 910 (1994) at 364.
See article AARON LARSON “FRAUD, SILENT FRAUD AND INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATION”, Oct, 2003,
available at http://www.expertlaw.com/library/pubarticles/Business_Law/fraud.html.
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42 N.E.2d 808 (1942).
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house the buyer purchased, the seller knew that the house was infested and the buyer could not
readily observe this condition upon inspection.71 The seller fraudulently and falsely concealed
from the buyer the house’s true condition. In Weintraub v. Krobatsh,72 a house was purchased
and the buyer discovered that it was infested by cockroaches when he moved in.73 The seller had
a duty to speak and failed to do so.74 In addition, the seller conducted the visit of the house
during the day although the buyer could have seen the cockroaches only during the night.75 The
buyer sued for rescission of the contract. The Weintraub court refers to Keen v. James,76 where
the court pointed out that “silence may be fraudulent and the relief may be granted to one
contractual party where the other suppresses facts which he, under the circumstances, is bound in
conscience and duty to disclose to the other party, and in respect to which he cannot, innocently,
be silent.”77 Therefore, even if the buyer has to make reasonable investigations about the good he
wants to purchase,78 the seller still has a duty to speak.79
This duty to disclose imposed by the law to the seller constitutes an exception to the wellknown doctrine of caveat emptor. This doctrine no longer prevails and courts do not apply it
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Id. at 678
317 A.2d 68 (1974).
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Id. at 70
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Id. at 72 relying on Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672 at 674 (1960).
75
Id. at 70
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39 N.J.Eq. 527 (E. & A. 1885).
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Id. at 541
78
See Simmons v. Evans, 206 S.W.2d 295 (1947) in which the plaintiffs purchased a house in which the water was
supplied only at the day time but not at night. The sellers failed to disclose this important fact and the plaintiffs filed
an action to rescind their purchase. But the lower court dismissed it on the ground that “the defendants had not made
any written or verbal representations and the plaintiffs had inspected the property, knew the source of the water
supply, and could have made specific inquiry of these defendants or ascertained from other sources the true situation
and, therefore, are estopped.” 206 S.W.2d at 296. However, the dismissal was reversed on appeal. The court asserts
that “one may be guilty of fraud by his silence, as here it is expressly incumbent upon him to speak concerning
material matters that are entirely within his own knowledge” 206 S.W.2d at 296 and also that the plaintiffs were not
required to “make a night inspection in order to ascertain whether the water situation with reference to this residence
was different from what it was during the day.” 206 S.W.2d at 297.
79
See Conover v. Wardell, 22 N.J. Eq 492 at 498-99 (E. & A. 1871), “under the circumstances, is bound in
conscience and duty to disclose to the other party, and in respect to which he cannot, innocently, be silent.”
72
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anymore (or in rare cases).80 In Obde v. Schlemeyer,81 a similar case about fraudulent silence,
the seller had a duty to disclose that the apartment was infested by termites and failed to do so.82
The court asserted that there is a duty to speak whenever justice, equity and fair dealing demand
it. Indeed, because a termite infestation of an apartment is a serious and dangerous condition
(major condition), the seller had a strong responsibility is to disclose this fact and thus not
mislead the buyer by keeping silent about it.83 Therefore, if a seller fails to disclose a material
fact or to answer a question asked by the purchaser, he can be liable for fraudulent
nondisclosure.84 The court indicated the difference between minor conditions, which ordinary
parties would reasonably disregard as of little or no materiality in the transaction which would
clearly not call for judicial intervention, and major condition upon which sellers have a duty to
disclose and a duty to speak. Moreover, the seller has the duty to disclose the material facts, and
a half-truth will be considered as misrepresentation unless the party to whom such a revelation is
made does not rely upon it.85 Also, according to Restatement Second of Contracts86 there are
some limited cases when the non-disclosure is equivalent to an assertion.87
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See e.g. about the doctrine of caveat emptor which is not applied anymore in New Jersey Berman v. Gurwicz, 458
A.2d 1311 at 455 (Ch. Div. 1981), Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 at 209 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963), Easton v.
Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1984).
81
353 P.2d 672 (1960).
82
Id. at 675
83
Ensminger v. Terminix Int’l Co., 102 F. 3d 1571 (10th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (1985);
Mercer v. Woodard, 303 S.E.2d 475 (1983); Lynn v. Taylor, 642 P.2d 131 (1982).
84
In some decisions the court refers to the “duty to speak.” See Marchand v. Presutti, 505 A.2d. 1092 (1986).
85
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 1031 (1980).
More explanations will be made on the notion of misrepresentation in part 2) Misrepresentation.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT §161 provides “a person’s non-disclosure of a fact known to him is
equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist in the following cases only: (a) where he knows that disclosure
of the fact is necessary to prevent some previous assertion from being a misrepresentation or from being fraudulent
or material. (b) Where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to a basic
assumption on which that party is making the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in
good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing. (c) Where he knows that disclosure of the
fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to the contents or effect of a writing, evidencing or embodying an
agreement in whole or in part. (d) Where the other person is entitled to know the fact because of a relation of trust
and confidence between them.”
87
See Skagit State Bank v. Rasmussen, 716 P.2d 314 (1986); 745 P.2d 37 (1987).
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Because dealings are often long and complicated, it is important for both of the parties to
disclose any relevant information. Moreover, sometimes it is not only important to disclose
information about what is being sold but also any information about the legal effect of the
contract terms.88 The seller has a duty to inform the buyer about the contract when it contains
either fine print or hidden terms. This duty especially exists when one party is in a superior
position or has superior knowledge.89 If the information is not disclosed, such a contract will be
an unconscionable one regarding the bargaining power of the stronger party.90
In French law, the principle and legal effects of this duty to disclose or “obligation
précontractuelle de renseignement” is the same as in American law. French law imposes a precontractual obligation to disclose information.91 It is based on a mixture of statutory (consumer
protection by French Civil Code) and case-law intervention, but the courts have been prepared to
award damages on the basis of tort responsibility (or “responsabilité délictuelle”) for nondisclosure of certain essential and material facts provided by article 1382.92 As it is for
misrepresentation, misrepresentation by silence or “omission” in French law makes the contract
voidable.93 Thus the party can ask for rescission of the contract in a situation of “omission.”94
French law provides that silence is considered as a “dol” and more precisely a “dol négatif” if
88

Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68 (1974).
E.g. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971) in which one party could not read the lease because of
its lack of education. In such a case the other party has a duty to inform him about the terms and conditions of the
said lease.
90
Id. at 148 (1971) “when a party can show that the contract, which is sought to be enforced, was in fact an
unconscionable one, due to a prodigious amount of bargaining power on behalf of the stronger party, which is used
to the stronger party’s advantage and is unknown to the lesser party, causing a great hardship and risk on the lesser
party, the contract provision, or the contract as a whole, if the provision is not separable, should not be enforceable
on the grounds that the provision is contrary to public policy.”
91
PAULA GILIKER, PRE-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW, 128 (Kluwer Law International,
2002).
92
Article 1382 C.CIV. provides “tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la
faute duquel il est arrivé, à le réparer.” The idea of this provisions is that every act of someone, which cause to
someone’ else an injury, has the duty to repair it.
93
VALERIE TOULET, DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS RESPONSABILITE CIVILE, [CIVIL LAW, OBLIGATIONS CIVIL
RESPONSABILITY], 64 (édition centre de publications universitaire 1999).
94
Held v. Trafford Realty Co., 414 So. 2d 631 at 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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this silence is fraudulent and the party which has the duty to reveal some elements failed to do
so.95 For example, a “dol négatif” or “réticence dolosive” was recognized in a case where an
automobile mechanic kept silent about the fact that an engine was very old.96 The buyer
purchased the automobile with a strong believe that the engine was a new one regarding its
mileage. The automobile mechanic modified the mileage of the engine and kept silent about this
change. Thus, in cases like this one, courts consider that voluntary silence is in reality lack of
good faith.97
Furthermore, French law makes a distinction between persons who are not in the same
type of business (considered non-professionals or consumers) and others who are in the same
type of business. Similar to American law, French law gives more protection to consumers than
to parties who are engaged in the same type of business. It is important to note that usually the
duty to disclose is related to formation of a contract: a party signed a contract without being
informed or advised of certain facts which would have influenced his decision.
Although French law has no regulations in its civil code about preliminary contracts or
preliminary negotiations, it recognizes that at least at the beginning of the dealings no
responsibility could arise. This can be explained by the French law principle of “liberté
contractuelle” (freedom to contract). According to this concept, courts do not usually interfere in
private contractual relations except when a law suit is brought. Then, there are some risks which
are endured by both of the parties during negotiations. However, one party, usually the seller,

95

VALERIE TOULET, DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS RESPONSABILITE CIVILE, [CIVIL LAW, OBLIGATIONS CIVIL
RESPONSABILITY], 64 (édition centre de publications universitaire 1999).
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Cour de Cassation, Civ. 1re, 19.06.1985, Bull. civ. I, Numero 201, the court indicates that “en s’abstenant
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état, datait de 1968.”
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VALERIE TOULET, DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS RESPONSABILITE CIVILE, [CIVIL LAW, OBLIGATIONS CIVIL
RESPONSABILITY], 65 (édition centre de publications universitaire 1999).
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still has the duty to disclose and this party can be liable when he fails his obligation. In French
law, this responsibility will be based on lack of good faith.98

2) Misrepresentation
Sometimes at the time of negotiations a party wants to convince the other to contract and
will mislead with regard to some relevant material facts. Misrepresentation can be defined as the
act of making a false or misleading statement with the intent to deceive or mislead someone.99
According to Restatement Second of Contracts, misrepresentation is defined as “an assertion that
is not in accord with the facts.”100 However, sometimes it is difficult to differentiate the “seller’s
talk”101 (or “puffing”) from misrepresentation. Furthermore, in accordance with Restatement
Second of Torts §552C, the party who made the misrepresentation of a material fact “for the
purpose of inducing the other to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon it” shall be liable
“to the other for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation, even though it is not made fraudulently or negligently.”102
Therefore, in preliminary negotiations very often a party wants to mislead (or does
mislead) the other party with regard to some relevant facts of the subject matter of the contract.
However, to recover damages, the party who is misled has to prove some elements.103 To have a
successful claim the party must prove that there was a “false representation or concealment of a
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Liability based on article 1134 C.CIV. about good faith in contracts which provides: “les conventions légalement
formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites. Elles ne peuvent être révoquées que de leur consentement
mutuel, ou pour les causes que la loi autorise. Elles doivent être exécutées de bonne foi.”
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BLACK’S DICTIONARY 1016 (7TH ed. 1999)
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §159.
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ROBERT S. SUMMERS AND ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE,
AND PRACTICE, 550, (Fourth Edition 2001).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §552C (1); and also (2) which provides “damages recoverable under the rule
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of what he has received in the transaction.”
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See e.g. Dorris Joni Reed v. Robert J. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1983).
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material fact susceptible of knowledge, made with knowledge of its falsity or without sufficient
knowledge on the subject to warrant a representation, with the intent to induce the person to
whom it is made to act upon it; and such person must act in reliance upon the representation to
his damage.”104 Once all the elements of misrepresentation are met, the contract which has been
signed by the parties is voidable according to Restatement Second of Contracts §164(1).105
Indeed, the court asserts in Carpenter v. Vreeman106 that “a contract is voidable if a party’s
assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other party, and is
an assertion on which the recipient is justified in relying.”107 The agreement may also be an
unconscionable contract as provided by section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code.108 The
situation may be more difficult when no contract has been signed between the parties and they
are still in the process of negotiations. Restatement Second of Contracts §163 deals with this
particular matter.109
The misrepresentation may be fraudulent or “innocent.”110 A misrepresentation is
fraudulent “where the maker knows or believes the assertion to be false and intends to mislead
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Id. at 131
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §164 (1) provides: “if a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by
either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying,
the contract is voidable by the recipient.” See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §164 (2).
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409 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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Id. at 261
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reasonable opportunity to know of the character or essential terms of the proposed contract, his conduct is not
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110
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Edition 2001)
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the other party.”111 A misrepresentation is innocent if the party does not know it is false, but he is
wrong. In that case, the contract might still be avoided if the innocent misrepresentation was very
important, or material. It is material if it would induce the manifest assent by a party.112
Moreover, a misrepresentation is material if “the maker knows that, because of special reasons, it
would be likely to induce a particular party to assent, though it would not induce such assent by a
reasonable party.”113 If the misrepresentation is not fraudulent, therefore to be actionable it must
be material.114 For example, in Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc.,115 deals with misrepresentation
by an agent acting for the seller for the purchase of a house that had a termite infestation.116 In
this case, the agent knew about the termites’ infestation and misled the buyer.117 This is
fraudulent misrepresentation.
In French law, the notion of misrepresentation includes both the notion of “dol” and
“erreur.” The first notion, the “dol,”118 is when there is fraudulent misrepresentation.
“L’erreur” is when a mistake is made by one party but was not intentional.119 In French law,
when there is “dol” the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant used some “manoeuvres
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frauduleuses”120 with the real and manifest intent to mislead him.121 The “dol” has to be
decisive enough to lead the plaintiff to contract with the defendant.122 Moreover, the seriousness
of the “dol” shall be appreciated in concreto.123
Accordingly, a contract affected by either fraudulent misrepresentation or by mistake is
void.124 The parties will be put in the legal situation before the contract was made.125 However,
the victim of fraudulent misrepresentation or mistake may lose his power of avoidance by
affirming the contract.

3) Duty of care
Duty of care is defined as a duty owed by one to another to take reasonable care not to
cause physical, psychiatric or economic loss or harm.126 This notion is also involved at the
negotiation stage. Parties must deal in good faith and fairness. French law imposes some duties
of good conduct called “obligation de loyauté et de bonne foi” on both of parties, in addition to
the duty of care, called “obligation de vigilance.”127 When a party fails its duty of care under
French law, its responsibility will be analyzed under tort law.128 This duty of care can be
analyzed as an “obligation de moyens,” that is to say, to do everything that is possible to
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someone’ else an injury, has the duty to repair it.
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perform the contract correctly. Therefore, even if liability in negligence involves the lack and
failure to take reasonable care not to cause a foreseeable damage, it is not because one party fails
its duty of care (which failure results in damage) that this party will automatically be liable. This
party may inflict loss on another by his or her unreasonable conduct, and yet will not be
responsible.
In order to prove that one party has failed his duty of care, several requirements have to
be met. First, the party’s conduct must have been wrongful. This is the element of negligence.
The plaintiff has to prove that the defendant has been negligent.129 Second, he has to prove that
the defendant owns him a duty of care and the defendant’s conduct fell below the standard of a
reasonable person. Third, the damage has to be foreseeable. If not, the defendant has no duty of
care. However, in the early stages of preliminary negotiations it is sometimes very difficult to
determine whether the damage was foreseeable. Not all damages can be recovered under the duty
of care. The consequences are different depending on the type of damage. Damages resulting
from negligence during preliminary negotiations between the parties are frequently of economic
loss. These kinds of damages are difficult to recover,130 especially in the scope of economic
activity when much risk is involved. Therefore, the existence of the duty of care depends on the
nature of the damage resulting from a failure of care.131 In order to determine the liability of one
party to another, courts refer to the reasonable person standard.
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In fact, proving negligence is easier than proving fraud.
See A. J. E. JAFFEY, THE DUTY OF CARE: CHAP. 1 “TESTS AND CONCEPTS”, 4 (Edition Dartmouth 1992), when
the author cites as an example damages resulting to a failure to confer a benefit. This kind of damage is not
actionable in tort “although it may be in contract when the defendant has promised for consideration to provide the
benefit.”
131
Id. “whether a duty of care exists may depend on the kind of damage which the conduct in question causes.
Generally damage is not suffered for the purposes of the law of tort unless as the result of the defendant’s conduct
the plaintiff’s position is made worse than it would otherwise have been.”
130
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III- Some procedural problems that can arise when trying to prove misrepresentation or duty

to

disclose: parol evidence rule and merger clause
A- Effect of Parol Evidence Rule
There are different ways for the parties to a contract to express their assent and intent.
They may express their assent in oral or written language or by their acts and conduct.132 One
way to avoid dishonest behavior in the resolution of business disputes is to encourage the parties
to put their agreement in writing.133 This will limit the dispute resolution process to what the
written agreement says. This is exactly what the parol evidence rule provides.134 The parol
evidence rule seeks to preserve integrity of written agreements by forbidding contracting parties
from attempting to alter their contract through use of contemporaneous oral declarations.135
Under this rule, when the parties have made an agreement expressed in writing to which both
parties intend to be the final, complete and accurate integration of that contract, the agreement
cannot be varied or contradicted by evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of any prior written or
oral agreement, in the absence of fraud, duress, or mutual mistake. 136 Restatement Second of
Contracts §213 dealing with the parol evidence rule137 indicates the differences between
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MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE – “INCONSISTENT” AND “CONTRADICTORY” –
FORM OF WRITING – THE MEANING OF “INTEGRATION” §83 A. THE POSSIBLE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES, 431
(Fourth Edition 2001).
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LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, SYMPOSIUM: THEORY INFORMS BUSINESS PRACTICE: THE WRITTEN CONTRACT AS SAFE
HARBOR FOR DISHONEST CONDUCT, 77 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 87, 2001.
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Id.
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See BLACK’S DICTIONARY 1117 (7th ed. 1999); See HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS, THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND
IMPLIED TERMS: THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 35, 36 (1985) and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-202, 2A-202 for some current revisions of the rule, which provides that “if the parties assent to a writing as the
final and complete expression of the terms of their agreement, evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements
may not be admitted to contradict, vary, or add to the terms of the writing.”
136
See Harrison v. Fred S. James, P.A., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 438 (1983) (citing Scott v. Bryn Mawr Arms, 312 A.2d
592 at 594 (1973) “unless fraud, accident or mistake is averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between the
parties, and its terms cannot be added to nor subtracted from by parol evidence.”) See also 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§573 (1960).
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §213 comment a “it is not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive
law. Nor is it a rule of interpretation; it defines the subject matter of interpretation. It renders inoperative prior
written agreements as well as prior oral agreements…”
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integrated agreements and completely integrated agreements.138 The question before a court
remains the same, that is to say, whether the parties intended their writing to be their final and
complete expression.139 When the parties agree that their sole writing will generate obligations
and be the only one which contains a complete statement of their undertakings, they show their
intention to not be bound by any other contemporaneous oral agreements.140 Moreover, any
antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted if they contradict or vary the
written agreement,141 but it is always possible to admit evidence of prior negotiations in case of
mistake.142
According to section 2-202 of the U.C.C., although it is not possible to contradict a
complete and final writing between the parties, it can be supplemented by some evidence of
course of performance, course of dealings and by any additional terms unless the court finds that
the writing had been intended as an exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.143 In some
138

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §213 which provides that “(1) a binding integrated agreement
discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them, (2) A binding completely integrated
agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are within its scope, (3) An integrated agreement that
is not binding or that is voidable and avoided does not discharge a prior agreement. But an integrated agreement,
even though not binding, may be effective to render inoperative a term which would have been part of the agreement
if it had not been integrated.”
139
See e.g. Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 436 P.2d 561 (1968).
140
See e.g. Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377 (1928) in which the question before the court is whether an oral
agreement shall be enforced when there is a complete written contract between the parties. See O’Malley v. Grady,
109 N.E. 829 (1915) in which the court asserted that the parol evidence rule “is more than a rule of evidence, and
oral testimony, even if admitted, will not control the written contract; Brady v. Nally, 45 N.E. 547 (1896).
141
Id. at 381
142
Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. Kline, 84 A.2d 301 (1951) at 302-303 “where no fraud, accident or mistake is averred
and proved, and the alleged prior or contemporaneous oral representation or agreement concerns a subject which is
specifically dealt with in the written contract, the law is clearly and well settled that the alleged oral representation
or agreement is merged in or superseded by the subsequent written contract and cannot vary, modify or supersede
the written contract;” “and hence parol evidence thereof is inadmissible in evidence” citing Grubb v. Rockey, 79
A.2d 255 (1951); Walker v. Saricks, 63 A.2d 9 (1949); Gianni v. Russell & Co., Inc., 126 A. 791 (1924); Speier v.
Michelson, 154 A. 127 (1931); O’Brien v. O’Brien, 66 A.2d 309 (1949); Russell v. Sickles, 160 A. 610 (1932).
143
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-202 “(1) Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their
agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement by may be explained or supplemented (a) by course of
performance, course of dealing, usage of trade (section 1-303); and (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms
unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement.”
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cases, the contract written by the parties is not clear enough and needs more details to determine
the real intention of the parties. This is the reason why the Uniform Commercial Code permits
the parties to bring in any evidence of their course of dealing, course of performance, and trade
usage.144 The real intention and understanding of the parties has to be known.145 In fact, a court
will have to look first to the contract and whether it is the complete and final expression of the
parties.146 Indeed, the question of whether further evidences will be allowed in the future will
depend upon the terms of the agreement.
Three possibilities can be distinguished.147 The first possibility is when the parties do not
intend their written agreement to preclude evidence of any documents or expression related to
their agreement. This possibility is unlikely because it does not prevent a party from resurrecting
evidence contrary to their agreement.148 However, when prior evidence contradicts the terms of
the writing, this evidence would not be operative if it is the apparent intention of the parties.
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Id. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-202 official comment 2 which explain that “paragraph (a) makes admissible
evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade and course of performance to explain or supplement the terms of any
writing stating the agreement of the parties in order that the true understanding of the parties as to the agreement
may be reached. Such writings are to be read on the assumption that the course of prior dealings between the parties
and the usages of trade were taken for granted when the document was phrased. Unless carefully negated they have
become an element of the meaning of the words used. Similarly, the course of actual performance by the parties is
considered the best indication of what they intended the writing to mean.”
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In order to do so, courts will analyze the intention of the parties by applying the “appearance” test. By such a test,
courts will ask the question of whether the parties intend their writing to be a final (partially integrated) or a
complete and exclusive (fully integrated) agreement.
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See MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS: §84. 3. THE NATURAL INCLUSION TEST – WILLISTON/CORBIN – GIANNI
V. RUSSEL – MITCHILL V. LATH – MASTERSON V. SINE, 442, (Fourth Edition 2001) citing 3 CORBIN § 582 at 457
(1963 ed.) “the Corbin position is simple: either the parties assented to the writing as an integrated agreement or
they did not, and all ‘respectable’ evidence should be considered to determine this critical question. This position is
completely consistent with the basic Corbin view that courts must determine whether the parties have agreed today
to nullify their agreement of yesterday and that there is no need to call upon some ‘parol evidence rule’ to prove that
intention.”
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MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS: §83 THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE – “INCONSISTENT” AND “
CONTRADICTORY” – FORM OF WRITING – THE MEANING OF “INTEGRATION” A. THE POSSIBLE INTENTION OF THE
PARTIES, 431, (Fourth Edition 2001).
148
Id. MURRAY wrote that “if the parties have taken the time and trouble to express themselves in writing, certainly
evidence of prior contradictory agreements appear less credible than the subsequent written agreement. Assuming
prior agreement was made, if the parties later executed a written agreement containing contradictory terms, the later
expression of agreement should prevail on the rudimentary principle of contract law that the parties may always
agree today to rescind or modify their agreement of yesterday.”
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Such contradictory terms are characterized as “inconsistent” with the terms of the final
writing.149
The second scenario is when the parties understand that their written contract is final as
to any matters included in the writing, but the parties do not exclude any other manifestations of
agreement not contained in the document by which they declare to be bound. This case occurs in
the preliminary negotiations when the parties sign a final written contract but also agree to admit
any kind of writings (related to their negotiation and to their written agreement) which occurred
during the negotiation process. However, such a case does not protect a party from any
documents that he did not expressly agree on or did not know about.
In the third and final category, the parties protect themselves by preventing any written or
oral declarations to reappear, and to do so they make clear that their writing is to be the final,
complete and exclusive manifestation of their agreement.150 In such a case, they express their
intention to be bound only by this agreement. Then, evidence of any anterior agreements
(whether consistent or not) would be automatically excluded whereas in the second category
only inconsistent terms will be inoperative. In addition, parties can express their intent by
including a merger clause in their agreement. This clause will provide that the parties intended
their writing to be their final and complete intention. This is discussed in the next section.
The second and third categories, the parties intended their writing to be final (second
possibility) or complete (third possibility) as to any particular matters including in their writing.
By such an expression a court will know the intent of the parties and will give an appropriate
149

See Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Doliner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 at 940 (1966) which give the definition of the
term “inconsistent”: “to be inconsistent, the term must contradict or negate a term of the writing.”
150
In Masterson, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 at 547 (1968) the court indicates that because the issue is whether there has been
an integration and whether the parties intended their writing to serve as the exclusive embodiment of their
agreement, therefore the first thing to look at is the writing. It can states that “there are no previous understandings
or agreements not contained in the writing, and thus express the parties’ intention to nullify antecedent
understandings or agreements.” the court cites 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1960) §578, 411.
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interpretation. Here again, the intention of the parties remains crucial. Courts will scrutinize
whether the parties intended their writing to be both complete and final.151 In such a case,
according to Restatement Second of Contracts §228152 the writing is “fully integrated”153 and
cannot support any evidence of prior understandings.154 If the writing is only final, but not
complete, it is said to be “partially integrated.” Then, it supports evidence of prior or
contemporaneous agreements if these do not contradict the terms of the final writing.155
Courts will sometimes focus on whether the writing contains a merger clause by which
the parties express their agreement as unique and fully integrated.156 Although it shows the
intention of the parties to have their writing as fully integrated, such a clause does not always
prevent one party to show evidence to the contrary.157

B- Effect of Merger Clause
The parties may want to include a merger clause, sometimes called an “integration” or
“zipper” clause, in their contract. This is a good way to be sure that every single element of their
151

See MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS: §83 THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE – “INCONSISTENT” AND
“CONTRADICTORY” – FORM OF WRITING – THE MEANING OF “INTEGRATION”. D. THE MEANING OF “INTEGRATED” –
“FULLY” OR “PARTIALLY” INTEGRATED, 433 (Fourth Edition 2001), in which the author explains that the courts
have to “focus on the threshold question in the application of the parol evidence rule: Did the parties intend their
writing to be final at least as to the matters expressed therein, or did they intend their writing to be both final and
complete so that no prior expression of agreement of any kind will be operative?”
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See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §228 which provides that “an agreement is integrated where the
parties thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final and complete expression of the agreement.” See also 3 CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS §581 at 441-42 (1960) “the parol evidence rule does not itself purport to establish the fact of
“integration”; and until that fact is established the “rule” does not purport to have any legal operation.”
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See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) §237 comment b. “an integration by definition contains what the parties agreed upon
as a complete statement of their promises.”
154
See South Side Plumbing Co. v. Tigges, 525 S.W.2d 583 at 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (the court indicates that
“evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements that varies or contradicts the terms of a written instrument is not
admissible absent fraud, accident, or mistake. But the rule is applicable only where the instrument is a complete
integration of the parties' agreement and is unambiguous. Where the agreement provides that the document plus any
additional documents identified thereunder shall comprise the entire agreement among the parties thereto, it is the
intention of the parties on the face of the agreement to create a complete and integrated contract.”)
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Merk v. Jewel Food Stores Div. of Jewel Cos., 945 F.2d 889 at 893 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 914,
112 S. Ct., 1951, 118 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1992); Intercorp., Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 877 F.2d 1524 at 1528 (11th Cir. 1989).
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Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985).
157
Id. at 665
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negotiations will be included in their written agreement. A merger clause provides that in the
absence of mistake or fraud, a written contract merges all prior and contemporaneous
negotiations in reference to the same subject, and the whole engagement of the parties and the
extent and manner of their undertaking are embraced in the writing.158 According to the court in
Gerdlund v. Electronic Dispensers Int’l,159 a merger clause has to reflect the parties’ intention
that their written agreement was intended to be final and complete.160 By such a clause the
parties state that their writing is the unique and exclusive agreement. They will be bound only by
this unique contract, and all agreements which are not cited in their contract (such as preliminary
documents written during the period of negotiations) are not taken into account. For example, in
Betz Labs v. Hines,161 the parties included a merger clause in their contract stating that the
writing constituted the unique agreement between the parties, and they did not intend to be
bound by any other agreement, understanding, representation, obligation or negotiation either
oral or written of whatsoever kind or nature.162
Such a merger clause should have legal effect because it reflects the intention of the
parties. The court in ARB, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc.163 asserts that “integration clauses, although
not ‘absolutely conclusive,’ are indicative of the intention of the parties to finalize their complete
understanding in the written contract that there was no other prior or contemporaneous
agreement not included in the written contract.”164 By such a clause the parties are making “the
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235 Cal. Rptr. 279 (6th Dist. 1987)
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Betz Labs v. Hines, 647 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1981).
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Id. at 403
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663 F.2d 189 (1980)
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Id. citing also Pumphrey v. Kehoe, 276 A.2d 194 at 199 (1971).

31

document a complete integration.”165 However, the merger clause will not be given effect if the
writing is too incomplete or there is either fraud or mistake.166 Indeed, merger clauses create a
strong presumption that the writing represents the final agreement between the parties. To rebut
this presumption and invalidate the merger clause as a result, the injured party must establish the
existence of fraud, bad faith, unconscionability, negligent omission or mistake in fact.167 Further,
to determine the intention of the parties a court can refer to the circumstances surrounding the
making of the agreement.168
Further, it seems that courts tend to enforce merger clauses when they are the result of
negotiations between the parties, whereas they do not tend to enforce printed merger clauses in
standardized agreements. The reason is obvious: printed clauses in standardized agreements are
given to not only one person but several. Thus, such a clause is not the ultimate result of
negotiation between the parties. Then there is no reason to give an enforceable effect to a merger
clause which was not the subject of dealings between the parties. For example, in Eberhardt v.
Comerica Bank,169 a case where a standardized agreement included a printed merger clause, the
court indicated that merger clauses are not given conclusive effects in cases when the parties’
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A. CORBIN, CORBIN IN CONTRACTS §578 (1960).
See MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, §84 THE PAROL EVIDENCE PROCESS – TESTS, 2. MERGER CLAUSE TEST,
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See Smith v. Central Soya of Athens, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 518 (1985); Neal v. Marrone, 79 S.E.2d 239 at 242
(1953); A & A Discount Center v. Sawyer, 219 S.E. 2d at 534-535 (1975).
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Shoreham Developers, Inc. v. Randolph Hills, Inc., 235 A.2d 735 at 739 (1967) “Maryland law further requires…
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and exclusive statement of their agreement.” See Rinaudo v. Bloom, 120 A.2d 184 at 190 (1956); See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §212 about interpretation of integrated agreement and comment c which suggests that in a
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of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction, preliminary negotiations and statements made therein, usages of
trade, and the course of dealing between the parties.”
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intent cannot be shown.170 Moreover, in Zinn v. Walker,171 the court stated that “when the
parties’ conduct indicates their intention to include collateral agreements despite the existence of
the merger clause… from the written contract, the parties’ intention should prevail.”172
Merger clauses aim to protect against the risk that one party will, honestly or dishonestly,
seek to resurrect some proposal that did not show up in the final writing. According to
Restatement Second of Contracts §215,173 if there is any evidence of previous dealings between
the parties which contradict a term of the writing, it is not admissible whereas evidence of a
consistent additional term is admissible.174 In contrast, Restatement Second of Contracts §214175
recommends that any evidence of negotiations and existing agreements should be shown before
the final writing. If there is collateral evidence a court may decide not to ignore it because the
writing contains a merger clause.176 In Masterson v. Sine,177 the court explains that the existence
of a merger clause does not of itself establish an integration and that a court should examine the
collateral agreement itself to determine whether the parties wanted it to be part of their

170

Id. at 243. See also Sierra Diesel Injection Serv. v. Burroughs Corp., 874 F.2d 653 at 656 (9th Cir. 1989).
361 S.E.2d 314 (1987).
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Id. at 334. See also T. A. Loving Co. v. Latham, 201 S.E.2d 516 (1974).
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bargain.178 However, some courts give merger clauses conclusive effect absent fraud, mistake, or
another reason to set aside the contract.179 In addition, according to some courts such a clause
creates a “rebuttable presumption that the writing is a complete and exclusive statement of the
contract terms.”180 It is important to emphasize that if the contract is void because of fraud,
mistake or other reasons invalidating the writing, a merger clause has no legal effect.181
Restatement Second of Contracts §214(d)182 provides that evidence of illegality, fraud, duress,
mistake, lack of consideration, or other invalidating causes is always admissible and is not barred
by the application of the parol evidence rule. Accordingly a party can either prove that there was
fraudulent misrepresentation, mistake,183 or a lack of consideration184 when the contract was
made.185 In some cases courts will look for extrinsic evidences of a prior agreement even if there
is no fraud, mistake or lack of consideration. An example would be when the writing contains a
merger clause which states that the writing contained the entire agreement and the court
interprets this as meaning that the contract between the parties contains the entire agreement as
to “its limited subject matter alone.”186 Courts usually hold parties to the contract terms when
they sign an agreement. But in order to give the strongest protection to them it remains crucial to
draft the merger clause carefully.
178

Id. at 563. See also Matthews v. Drew Chem. Corp., 475 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1973); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T.
Newcomb., Inc., 595 P.2d 709 (1979).
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CHAPTER II

LIABILITY WHEN A PRELIMINARY OR TENTATIVE AGREEMENT IS MADE, BUT
A FORMAL AGREEMENT IS CONTEMPLATED (BUT NEVER EXECUTED)

The liability is clear when a party fails to disclose some information or misrepresents
some facts. However, the liability when a tentative agreement is made but a formal agreement is
never executed is more difficult to establish. Some problems may arise during negotiations. The
parties may want to draft a letter of intent to memorize their dealings.

I- Preliminary negotiations in general—introduction to problems that can arise during
negotiations and things that can go wrong
In both legal systems, the parties have the duty to negotiate in good faith and with fair
dealing. In American law, Restatement Second of Contract §205 which deals with the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, provides that “every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”187 This notion is also defined by
the Vienna Convention188 and by the UNIDROIT Principles which both impose a duty to act in
good faith and with fair dealing in international trade.189 Good faith is a standard connoting
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §205
Article 7 (1) United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980).
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UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, article 1.7(1), and article 2.15 (upon
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intention to reach an agreement.)
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decency, fairness and reasonableness.190 The principle of good faith is applied in various
contractual contexts which point out the “faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and
consistency with the justified expectation to the other party.”191 The Uniform Commercial Code
imposes an obligation of good faith in contracts during both the performance of the contract and
its enforcement.
There are actually two definitions of this notion: one is generic192 and the other one deals
with merchants’ transactions.193 In transactions between merchants the standard of conduct
regarding good faith and fair dealing is higher than other transactions.194
Even there is no duress, misrepresentation, undue influence or unconscionability, the
absence of good faith will permit a court to refuse to enforce all or part of a contract.195 For
example, a court may deem the agreement of the parties inoperative because one of the parties
has not performed in good faith or did not conduct the negotiations in good faith.196 Moreover, it
is important to distinguish between the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the
performance and enforcement of contracts,197 and the duty to negotiate in good faith that arises
from a preliminary letter of intent.198
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §205, comment a.
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The duty to perform in good faith includes the obligation to use reasonable efforts,
whereas the duty to negotiate in good faith is influenced by the terms of the letter of intent.199
Thus, one duty is imposed by laws whereas the other by a private agreement between the parties.
The obligation to negotiate in good faith can be described as preventing one party from
“renouncing the deal, abandoning the negotiations, or insisting on conditions that do not conform
to the preliminary agreement.”200
French statutes make no distinction between the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing in the performance and enforcement of contracts, and the duty to negotiate in good faith
stated by a letter of intent. Article 1134 (3) of the French Civil Code provides that conventions
have to be performed in good faith.201 Therefore the parties must deal in good faith. Article 1135
of the French Civil Code adds that the convention leads to all legal suits that equity gives
according to the nature of the obligation.202 French law, like American law, has the requirement
of fairness and equity in contracts. However, the French Civil Code does not contain other
explicit references to the good faith principle. There are some situations when it is obvious that
the duty of good faith applies.203 French law distinguishes the formation of a contract from the
performance of a contract. When the contract is still in the formation process, the parties must
deal in good faith and fair dealing. Though the French civil code provides that the parties are free
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to enter into a contract, they still have to do so in good faith.204 French courts analyze whether
the principle of good faith has been respected by paying close attention to the assent of both
parties. Then French courts focus on whether there is a situation of deceit.205 When the contract
is performed, it also has to be in good faith.206 The parties have several duties, but two of them
apply the good faith principle: the duty of loyalty (devoir de loyauté)207 and the duty of
cooperation (devoir de coopération).208 The duty of loyalty includes two other duties: the
obligation of result (obligation de résultat) and the obligation of making reasonable efforts to
perform the obligations of the contract (obligation de moyens). By the former, one party has to
perform a specific obligation. One party will be free of obligations under contract law only when
the complete performance of the exact obligation or goal foreseen by the contract between the
parties is done.209 Therefore, a performance which does not reach the foreseen goal is not
considered a performance at all. However, the “obligation de moyens” is different. In such a
case, one party has to accomplish his obligation by acting with due care.210 The notion of
“obligation de moyens” is very close to the duty of care in American law. One party will have to
act in a “bon père de famille,”211 a notion very close to the reasonable person standard.

204

Id.
The court will analyze whether there was a misrepresentation or a fraud by one party to the other that will show a
lack of good faith. It could be “l’erreur sur la substance or sur la chose” or le “dol.”
206
See supra article 1134 C. CIV.
207
See article ALBERTO M. MUSY, THE GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE IN CONTRACT LAW AND THE PRECONTRACTUAL DUTY
TO DISCLOSE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEW DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL CULTURES, December 2000, which cites
some French cases rendered by the French Superior Court “cour de cassation”: Cass. Civ., April 8, 1987, Bull., III,
numéro 88, 53, RTD civ. 1988, 122 note J. Mestre; Cass., juin 5, 1968, D., 1970, 543, note Ph. Jestaz; See also
statutes about consumer protection article 1244-1 of C. CIV. and article 331-1 CONSUMER CODE.
208
This kind of duty is related only to certain contracts. See Y. PICOD, L’OBLIGATION DE COOPÉRATION DANS
L’EXÉCUTION DU CONTRAT [OBLIGATION OF COOPERATION IN PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT], JCP 1988, I, 3318;
TERRÉ F., SIMLER R., LAQUETTE Y., DROIT CIVIL – LES OBLIGATIONS, §416, 350 (6e édition, Paris, 1996).
209
E.g. a customer gives his car to a garage mechanic because it has a problem with the brakes. The garage
mechanic will be free of obligations when the brakes of the car are completely fixed and are working again.
210
E.g. doctors and lawyers have this “obligation de moyens” that is to say to take reasonable care and to do
everything it is possible to perform the contract. When a doctor operates on a patient he has to perform the surgery
with care and doing everything is currently possible to perform correctly the surgery and reach the foreseen result.
211
Good father of family
205

38

Further, the duty of cooperation implies two different categories, the good faith in
contracts and the duty to disclose.212 Contrary to the American law notion of good faith, French
law in both its statutes and case law does not make a clear the distinction between subjective and
objective good faith. This is shown particularly in cases involving “reticence dolosive” (silent
misrepresentation) and “erreur sur la substance” (“mistake on the substance”).213
Because the negotiation period is a time of risk, the parties may want to draft a
preliminary writing that aims to protect them from an eventual unlawful breach by one party.
They also may want to clarify their dealings in a document. Here again, it is important to know
the intent of each party to determine whether they want to be bound by their preliminary writing.
Therefore the law will determine whether these preliminary agreements should be enforced, and,
if they are enforced, what the remedies should be in case of a breach by one party.214
In defining preliminary negotiations, Restatement Second of Contracts §26 provides that
“a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to whom it is
addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend to conclude a
bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent.” Moreover, according to Murray,
“preliminary negotiations as to the terms of an agreement do not constitute a contract although
this does not preclude the formation of a binding contract during negotiations.”215 To determine
whether the parties intended to be bound by their preliminary agreements, a court will have to
seek their respective intentions. A court refers to the express, not the inner intention, of the
parties. It seems that the closer the preliminary agreement is to a contract (because this
212
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preliminary agreement contains all the elements necessary to constitute a contract), the greater
chance it has to be recognized as enforceable at law and therefore binding between the parties.
Indeed, in a preliminary agreement which is supported by a valid consideration, an agreement of
both parties on important elements of the agreement and their mutual intention to contract
together shall be recognized as binding. It will be the same result in French law if the preliminary
agreement reaches the elements of a valid contract which are defined in article 1101 of the
French Civil Code.
The court in Citizens’ Committee of North End v. Hampton216 indicates the importance
of acts and conduct of the parties to determine whether there was a contract. There the court had
to resolve whether a contract was made between the parties during the negotiation period.217 The
court will also pay attention to the type of document on which the parties indicate that they are
bound.218 Documents as communications between the parties shall not be construed as an
agreement.219 These are only private communications between the parties regulating the scope of
preliminary negotiations. The parties usually do not intend to have these types of documents
enforceable at law, but, in some cases, courts recognize these documents as binding because they
contain all the essential elements necessary to constitute a valid contract.220 Indeed, in Parkview
General Hospital, Inc. v. Eppes,221 the parties were bound by their communications which
constituted an offer and an acceptance.
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On the other hand, in Onyx Oils & Resins, Inc. v. Moss,222 the court indicated that a
preliminary writing or agreement on only some elements of a proposed contract cannot be
enforced at law.223 Moreover, a proposal left open to further negotiation has to be accepted to be
binding. However, in Lombardo v. Gasparini Excavating Co,224 the court observed that “the
parties intended only to enter into a binding agreement sometime in the future. In such a case, the
preliminary negotiations do not constitute a contract.”225 Therefore, the requirement of certainty
is important. A binding and enforceable contract has to be certain and clear regarding its
elements as well as the nature and extent of its obligations. The parties must agree upon every
important part of the dealing.
In an important case, Channel Home Centers v. Grossman,226 the court states that “it is
hornbook law that evidence of preliminary negotiations or an agreement to enter into a binding
contract in the future does not alone constitute a contract.”227 Thus, a contract has to be made to
recognize preliminary negotiations as binding between the parties.228 Moreover, the court
asserted that the question of whether there is a contract formed between the parties is one for the
trier of fact.229 The court indicated that for an agreement to be enforceable, the parties should
demonstrate that they intend to have their agreement binding. The terms of the agreement have to
be definite and clear enough (to avoid ambiguity) and there must be consideration on both
222
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sides.230 To determinate the nature of a preliminary document, the court may refer to some
evidence of preliminary negotiations which occurred between the parties.231

Therefore, a

preliminary agreement drafted by the parties has to be scrutinized by the courts to determine its
legal nature.
The parties may want to include a condition precedent or “condition suspensive”232 in
their contract, by which at its realization the contract will be formed and consequently binding.
Both American and French legal systems allow parties to include such a provision in their
contracts.233 By including a condition precedent, the parties protect themselves from a wrongful
interpretation of their preliminary writing by a court. It will be a condition precedent to the
existence of a contract.234 Consequently, the parties have agreed that the contract will be
enforceable at law and effective when the condition precedent occurs or is performed. Whatever
this condition precedent is, the contract will not be operative until the happening of the event (or
the performance of something stated in the contract) by one of the parties, both of them, or even
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by a third person.235 As an example, the parties may wish to reduce their agreement into a certain
form of writing. The parties include a condition precedent which states that they will be bound
when their agreement will be reduced in writing.
In addition to the condition precedent, the parties may want to include some essential
terms in their preliminary agreement or their final contract. Whether the preliminary writing
between the parties will be binding depends on the terms included in their contract and the
importance given by both of the parties to these terms. Some terms are essential (as the subject
matter of the contract, quantity of goods, place of delivery of goods, etc) and others are
unessential (where matters will be discussed later on by the parties and are not essential to the
agreement). The parties must agree on essential terms of their agreement. They must agree upon
the material and necessary details of the bargain.236 If any essential term is left open for future
consideration there is no binding contract. But when the parties agree on the essential terms of
their agreement, that is to say, upon the material and necessary details of the bargain, their
agreement can constitute an enforceable contract according to the court in several cases even if a
later written agreement was contemplated.237 The court asks to whether the elements (terms) of
the contract are certain enough to provide a basis for an appropriate remedy. In Linnet v.
Hitchcock,238 the court assets that “the essential terms of the agreement are too uncertain to
permit enforcement of the agreement in favor of either party.”239 The court held that if “the
essential terms of the agreement were so uncertain that there was no basis for determining
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whether the agreement was kept or broken, there was no enforceable contract.”240 The court
applies the same rule in Lombardo v. Gasparini Excavating Co.241 by emphasizing that since the
parties intended to conclude an enforceable contract and the essential terms of that agreement
were certain enough in the sense that they provided a basis for an appropriate remedy, the
agreement was an enforceable contract. However, where a preliminary agreement leaves some
important terms to be agreed upon later, it is not an enforceable contract.242
In order to determine the scope and extent of their dealings the parties may want to draft
an agreement or intent which will reduce the contract to writing or make it more formal. Here
again it is a question of intent243 whether the parties will be bound by their previous dealing,
especially by an oral or informal agreement prior to the contemplated contract. The court in
United States for the Use and Benefit of Cortolano & Barone, Inc. v. Morano Construction
Corp.,244 indicates that “it is recognized that if the parties intend not to be bound until they have
executed a formal document embodying their agreement, they will not be bound until then.”245
Sometimes the parties may want to include a condition precedent in their preliminary writing
which indicates that they will not be bound until they sign a final contract.246 However, the
parties have to be aware of the fact that some obligations may arise from their oral or informal
agreement even if they express their intent to be bound only upon the performance of the full and
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final contract.247 Thus, it really depends on the intention of the parties whether provisions of
informal agreements which are to be incorporated into a written contract constitute a binding
contract in themselves.248
According to Restatement Second of Contracts §27,249 besides the intent of the parties,
the circumstances surrounding the dealings may show that the agreements and writings are
preliminary negotiations. In fact, according to the Restatement, manifestations of assent are
necessary to constitute a contract. Indeed, in Kazanjian v. New England Petroleum Corp.,250 the
court indicated that preliminary dealings do not constitute a binding contract.251 Nevertheless, if
the parties orally agree to all the terms and provisions of their contract, and they want to draft
their final agreement as soon as possible (which will reflect their previous dealings and therefore
include all the terms and provisions stated in the first draft upon which they orally agreed), the
oral contract may be enforceable.252 In addition, the courts in several cases have recognized that
when the parties act under their preliminary agreement, it will be considered as binding between
them notwithstanding that a formal contract had never been executed.253
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II - Letters of Intent
A- Definition of Letters of Intent
1) Definition and notion
In order to protect themselves during the period of negotiations, the parties can draft a
letter of intent which may be recognized as enforceable at law. A letter of intent is used to
memorialize a basic agreement and to flush out any potential deal breaking issues early in the
negotiating process.254 This type of document is often used in business transactions in order to
focus the parties on open issues, increase efficiency and indicate willingness to negotiate
diligently and in good faith.255
The difficult question raised by this type of document is whether it constitutes a contract
enforceable at law. Indeed, even if the first aim of a letter of intent is to memorialize a basic
agreement, it does not indicate that it is binding. The parties can finalize their contractual relation
faster than they would have done without drafting a letter of intent. But the question still stands
whether or not such pre-contractual writing is a contract.
In international negotiations, the parties should ask themselves which country’s law they
wish to apply to the transaction. The judge has to resolve the difficult question of choice of law
in accordance with his or her own legal system of conflict of laws.256 In the French legal system,
the judge will determine the law applicable to the contract (to resolve the question of whether a
contract exists) in accordance with the provisions of the Rome Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations of June 19, 1980. The same convention applies to all the
members of the European Community. If nothing is stated in the document regarding the
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applicable law,257 the judge will apply the law of the country where the contract has the most
connection.258 Article 4 of the Rome Convention refers to the principle of proper law in
American law.259 Therefore, in international negotiations, when the parties are dealing within the
European borders, the judge will go through all these steps to determine the law of the contract
and then, in accordance with this law, decide whether a contract was drafted between the parties.
In the American system, the judge will decide if the letter of intent is binding as a
contract in accordance with the definition of the term contract itself, the intent of the parties, and
some other relevant elements.

2) Distinction from other documents
The question at issue is whether a letter of intent constitutes a valid and enforceable
contract at law. In fact, the enforceability of a contract really depends on a lot of factors,260 and it
is interesting to look closer at the definition itself of a contract.
In American law a contract is “an agreement between two or more persons which creates
an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing.”261 A valid contract has to be made by a clear,
definite and express offer upon which is made an acceptance to the exact same terms. A contract
is supported by a valid consideration.
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A letter of intent is by itself not a contract at all. In fact, a letter of intent is not supported
by any consideration except maybe to negotiate or to conclude the contract in a short period of
time. It would be a hard task to prove that the letter of intent is supported by a valid
consideration. In addition, according to Restatement Second of Contracts §71, a consideration
can be an act “other than a promise.”262 A letter of intent also may include an offer and an
acceptance. But because the parties are still negotiating, any agreement is not yet final. The terms
upon which they agree can be discussed again further.
French law defines a contract as a promise to do or not to do something.263 It also says
that a promise will be enforced or at least recognized in some way.264 Therefore, a contract is an
enforceable document. It reveals the intention of both parties to be bound by such an agreement.
French law is a system where the subjective will of the parties is very important and comes first
in deciding whether there is a contract.265 Thus, a letter of intent may be considered as a contract
in the sense that the parties are bound by it if the parties intended to be. The parties have the
liberty to contract but they also have the choice not to contract. The intent of the parties has to be
shown. Otherwise, the parties could be considered as bound by their writing (formalized into a
letter of intent) even if they did not intend to be. In both legal systems, because of this thin line
between contract and letter of intent, the courts have the difficult task to determine whether there
is an enforceable contract between the parties.
There is another kind of document that is distinguishable from a letter of intent (and
contract also), a memorandum of understanding. A memorandum is not a binding contract, so it
262
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differs from a letter of intent which can be recognized as binding. A memorandum is a less
formal document which shows that the minds of the parties have not met. This writing does not
express a completed agreement, but states terms which, if accepted, would be the foundation of a
contract. It is a document used to summarize the legal situation of the parties when they are still
negotiating.
The question is how the parties can be sure that their letter of intent will not be
considered as binding by a jurisdiction when they do not want it to have legal force. Thus the
legal nature of letter of intent has to be analyzed.

A- Legal nature of Letter of Intent
1) Duty to negotiate in good faith and with fair dealing
Before analyzing in depth the behavior of the parties in order to recognize whether the
letter of intent is binding, it is necessary to point out that the parties have a duty to negotiate in
good faith and conduct the negotiations with fairness.
The letter of intent can include some condition such as the parties having to make a
reasonable effort to negotiate in good faith in order to finalize the transaction. Moreover, the
parties can indicate in their writing that they have a duty to negotiate with each other. For
example, in Feldman v. Allegheny International, Inc.,266 the seller was bound to negotiate
exclusively with the buyer until they disagreed.267 However it is important to bear in mind that in
such a case “the letter of intent is merely an agreement to negotiate, not a promise that those
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negotiations would be fruitful.”268 The parties have to determine the scope of their obligations in
their letter of intent. In addition, in A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium v. I.M.C. Chem,269 the court
asserted that the extent of any obligation to deal in good faith and fair dealing can only be
analyzed and determined from the structure of the letter of intent written by the parties.270
Under the duty to negotiate in good faith, the parties cannot vary from the content of the
letter of intent.271 In Channel Home Centers, Grace Retail v. Grossman,272 an action was brought
for breach of contract to negotiate in good faith. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that the letter of intent was not an enforceable contract because it
did not bind the parties to any obligations, it was unenforceable for lack of consideration, and
finally, because it was insufficient to satisfy the requirement of the Pennsylvania Statute of
Frauds for leases.273 The plaintiff appealed and won the case.274 The Court of Appeals held that
the letter of intent imposed a duty to negotiate in good faith for reasonable and certain periods of
time.275 The court referred to the intent of the parties.276
In several cases, courts held that there are two different kinds of agreements: agreements
to agree, which do not constitute a closed proposition, and agreements to negotiate in good faith,
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which are closed propositions that are “discrete and actionable.”277 These two agreements thus
have to be distinguished because their effects are not the same.
Furthermore, Restatement Second of Contracts §205 provides that “every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement.”278 It implies that the parties have to negotiate in good faith and with fair dealing in
order to reach a final contract. When the parties are bound to a letter of intent which indicates
their duty to negotiate in good faith, there is always the possibility that one of them does not
want to continue dealing with the other and then wants to terminate the contract.279 It should be
possible for one party to get out of the contract or pre-contract under the principle of freedom of
contract. Nevertheless, a party bound by the obligation to continue negotiations in good faith
cannot withdraw the contract at will. If he does so, the injured party will be able to sue him under
breach of contract to negotiate in good faith and ask for damages. However, in such a case, only
restitution or reliance damages can usually be awarded but not expectancy damages. Restitution
damages will include the out-of-pocket expenses like lawyer’s fees and due diligence costs.280
Courts will scrutinize the letter of intent in question to determine whether it creates a duty
to negotiate in good faith. If there is no express duty to negotiate in good faith, the document
may impose implied obligations upon the parties, especially of course the duty to negotiate in
good faith. If it is not the case, the document shall be considered as a memorandum which aims
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to memorialize the state of ongoing negotiations.281 Therefore, the parties have to pay close
attention to the words in their letter of intent, to the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of
this writing, and to the acts by the parties after the conclusion of the letter of intent.

2) Behavior of parties: words and acts
a- Situations in which the Letter of Intent is recognized as binding
First of all, it is important to know the intent of the parties and whether they desired their
letter of intent to be a binding writing. In American law, the most important remaining issue is
whether the parties have manifested their intent to contract and to be bound by this agreement.
Sometimes courts will recognize a letter of intent as a binding document if the parties have
expressed their willingness to be bound, and the writing is sufficient to be binding (that is, if the
parties agreed on all the essential terms of the contract and it is supported by a valid
consideration). In Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines,282 the court specifies that a
letter of intent will not be enforceable unless the parties really intend for it to be a legally binding
writing.283 Thus, courts have to know the express intent, that is to say, the outward expression, of
the parties.284 To do so, courts will refer to the terms of the letter of intent. For example, a letter
of intent might include a provision such as, “[this letter of intent] is a legal document that creates
binding obligations. If not understood, consult an attorney.” This is considered as a binding
contract by the effects of this provision.285 That is the reason why the parties have to pay close
attention to the words stated in their document.
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The parties should avoid any ambiguity in their document. Courts will analyze whether
the language of a purported contract is ambiguous as to the parties' intent. If no ambiguity exists
in the writing, the parties' intent must be derived solely from the writing itself. If the terms of an
alleged contract are ambiguous or capable of more than one interpretation, however, parol
evidence is admissible to ascertain the parties' intent. Furthermore, the interpretation of the
language is not a question of law but a question of fact if the language of an alleged contract is
ambiguous regarding the parties' intent.286 Indeed, in McCarthy v. Tobin287 the court asserted
that the parties have to be careful that the preliminary agreement include language indicating
whether or not it will be considered binding.288 In Quake, on appeal, the court analyzed the intent
of the parties and found that the letter of intent was ambiguous regarding the intent of the parties
to be bound. The court reasoned that “although the letter of intent included detailed terms of the
agreement, the letter also referred several times to the execution of a formal agreement, thus
indicating that the intent was not to be bound by the letter.”289 It seems that a letter of intent is a
binding writing between the parties when there is a meeting of minds of the parties, that is to say
they agreed upon the same terms of the letter of intent. In addition, a binding letter of intent must
be supported by sufficient consideration and fully executed (signed, delivered and accepted by
the parties).290 Moreover, in Quake, the court asserted that a letter of intent is not a binding
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agreement if execution of a formal agreement is listed as a condition precedent to
enforcement.291
In French law, it is quite similar to American law regarding the legal regime of letters of
intent. French courts look at the intent of the parties. According to the rules of French contract
law, a proposal may become the basis of a contractual obligation only if the clear, express and
firm intention of the parties is shown.292 Indeed, the parties must give willing assent. One cannot
force another to contract. However some difficulties can arise when a party expresses just a
vague intention to contract, especially the possibility to accept the agreement. Courts will refer to
the outward intention of the parties. In some cases, this intention could be hard to find because
there is a difference between the outward intention and the real intention of the parties.
Therefore, when the express intent is ambiguous, courts will interpret it to find the real intent of
the parties. Indeed, only the real intent of the parties generates contractual obligations.
Nevertheless, courts will correct this “subjective approach” to contract by reference to the social
value of trust, taking into account the outward expression of one party’s intent as manifested by
their actions and understood by the other party.293 French law tries to accommodate the objective
and subjective approach regarding the intent to contract by emphasizing the importance of the
real intent but by balancing it by considering the outward intention.294 According to article 1156
of the French Civil Code the real intent of the parties must be sought.295 The French legal system
does not have the principle of reliance as it exists in the American legal system. However, courts
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have a tendency to decide that this declared intent is binding if it has been understood as such by
the other party.296
Furthermore, if the parties agreed on the essential terms stated in their letter of intent, this
writing will be binding between them (if they want it to). Indeed, according to article 1583 of the
French Civil Code, “the sale is perfect when there is an agreement on the thing and the price.”297
Moreover, sometimes the parties state in their letter of intent that even if they did agree on all the
terms, an additional formality will have to be completed in the near future. It could be, for
example, the drafting of a formal document or an authorization to be given by an authority.
However, the question of whether this formality is a sine qua non condition to the formation of
the contract is not relevant in French or American law. Indeed, the French civil code provides
that the promise to sell is a sale when the parties mutually agreed on the thing and the price.298

b- Situations in which the Letter of Intent is not recognized as binding
In both legal systems, it seems that a letter of intent is declared to be a binding contract
when all the constitutive elements of a valid contract are met. In the American law system, a
letter of intent can be recognized as a non binding document either because the parties express
their intention not to be bound or because not all the necessary elements of a valid contract are
met. Moreover, courts can find that the parties did not intend to be bound even if it is not
expressly said in their writing. Indeed, this was the case in Philmar Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. New
York Street Associates II,299 where the court found that the parties did not express their intent to
be bound. Here, as a result of the absence of manifestation of intention, the court indicated that
296
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no enforceable agreement existed regarding the negotiations concerning the terms of a possible
future contract.300 In addition, the intent of the parties has to be respected and the court went on
by indicating that the letter of intent provided that “neither party would be bound until a mutually
satisfactory lease had been negotiated and executed.”301 Moreover, a letter of intent stating that
the parties would be interested in working together is not a binding contract.302 Indeed, this letter
of intent did not aim to bind either party.303 Furthermore, in Officemax, Inc. v. Sapp,304 the court
held unenforceable a clause in a letter of intent because it was not supported by valid
consideration and was “not sufficiently definite [as] to all of its essential terms.”305
If the parties do not intend to be bound by their letter of intent, they have to be careful
about the words they use. For example, the parties should not use terms like “contract” or
“agreement” in their letter of intent. Preferable terms include “proposal,” “term sheet” or “list of
proposed points.”306 Moreover, the parties should stipulate that the letter of intent cannot
generate binding obligations, even the obligation to negotiate in good faith.307 They should also
not include essential terms of an agreement since a court will not recognize it as binding (for
example, they should not stipulate the price). Here again, the words in the letter of intent remain
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very important because courts will rely on them to decide whether the document is binding or
not.
Furthermore, Restatement Second of Contracts §21 allows the parties to exclude the
binding force of their agreement.308 It provides that “neither real nor apparent intention that a
promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of
intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a
contract.”309 Moreover, such a clause negating contractual sanction may be held unenforceable as
against public policy “because it unreasonably limits recourse to the courts or as
‘unconscionably’ limiting the remedies for breach of contract.”310
In French law, it is quite the same as American law: the parties may clearly express their
intention not to be bound by any contractual obligations.311 In order to do so, the parties
expressly exclude the existence of a contract or they exclude the legal sanctions of an obligation
they accepted to undertake.312 However, commercial and business relations are usually not
without legal obligations or duties. Therefore if the parties want their letter of intent not to be
binding they have to expressly stipulate it in their letter of intent. As it is in American law,
parties must pay close attention to the words in their document. They may wish to write on the
top of their document “subject to contract” or “this document is not a contract” (“document non
contractuel”).313 French courts, respecting the intention of the parties, will declare such a letter
of intent or writing as not binding and without any contractual force. Clearly, courts take a close
look at the real intent of the parties and whether this intent has been indicated in their writing.
308
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Therefore the parties have to be very clear and express their intent not to be bound. In addition,
courts will pay attention to the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the writing and thus
whatever is stated in the writing.314
In some cases, the parties express their intent to be bound by their letter of intent but not
to be bound by any legal sanctions in a case of a breach.315 The issue is whether such clauses are
legal and enforceable. French courts refuse to admit these kinds of clauses when they relate to
the non-performance of the main thrust of obligation of the contract. Since the contract is not
valid and enforceable anymore, neither is the clause.316
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CHAPTER III

OTHER BASES FOR LIABILITY: RELIANCE, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, AND TORT

In both systems the parties can express their intent not to be bound and courts will
recognize it when it is clearly and expressly stipulated in their writing. Nevertheless, the situation
is different when the parties did not draft any documents relating to their negotiation period.
Therefore, in case of a wrongful breach of negotiations when there is not a breach of the
good faith duty, parties must use other legal remedies provided, such as promissory estoppel or
unjust enrichment theory.

I- Promissory estoppel
Whereas few problems arise in relation to pre-contractual liability when a contract has
been formed or at least a tentative agreement is made but never executed, real problems and
difficulties exist where no contract has been reached. Indeed, in such a case neither the French
Civil Code nor the traditional rules of French contract law contain any provisions.317
Nevertheless, French law still has the concept of good faith and fair dealing as a prerequisite in
contractual negotiations.318 During this period of negotiations, both parties have some
obligations like the duty to negotiate in good faith and with fair dealing, the duty to disclose, the

317

PAULA GILIKER, PRE-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW, 137 (ed. Kluwer Law
International, 2002).
318
Id.

59

duty of care and some others.319 However, it remains very difficult to hold a party liable when no
contract is reached at the end.
In the United States, the law provides a remedy which is an obligation arising from justified
reliance called promissory estoppel. By this theory, no one may change his mind to the injury of
another.320 Indeed, the idea behind this doctrine is the principle of fairness and equity. Where one
party, the promisor, expects another party, the promisee, to rely on the promise and “the
promisee does rely to its detriment, it would be unjust to refuse to enforce the promise.”321 In
addition, some courts define this doctrine as a promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee and which does induce action
or forbearance which is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.322 Restatement Second of Contracts §90 gives the definition of promissory estoppel as
“a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action
or forbearance [that] is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.”323 Indeed, if someone has suffered any injury or damage from the non performance of
a promise on which he did rely on and trust another person, consequently the promisor is bound
to make good the matter and in sum to perform the promise.324 Thus, the promise is binding if
the promisee has suffered some detriment in reliance thereon even if this detriment was not
319
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requested as consideration.325 Furthermore, it has been said that this doctrine is a substitute for
consideration or can also be seen as an exception to its classic requirements.326 If someone has
relied to his detriment on the words and acts of another, he has consequently suffered a loss.327
Thus that person shall be able to recover from this loss. Of course the case would be different if a
contract has been breached. Then the injured party cannot make a claim under the theory of
promissory estoppel, and no reliance or out-of-pocket loss need be shown to allow this party to
recover the loss. Therefore, when a contract is reached, the remedy of promissory estoppel
cannot be used. Indeed, according to the court in Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc.,328
claims for promissory estoppel and breach of contract cannot be brought together - they are
separate claims.329 The doctrine of promissory estoppel is used when the elements of a contract
are not met but the promise should be enforced in order to avoid injustice.330 The reason for the
promissory estoppel theory is fairness and reasonable reliance on the promise.331 When one party
relied on the other’s promise, the party who made this promise shall be liable if he or she
breaches the promise. The problem is that during the stage of negotiation there is no real
“promise” except to conduct negotiations in good faith and with fair dealing.
Thus, the question is whether a party can claim a breach of negotiation under the
promissory estoppel doctrine. In order to resolve that particular issue, the study of each element
of the promissory estoppel theory remains important. In order to succeed in a promissory
325
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estoppel claim, the plaintiff has to show three main elements: first, that there is a promise which
was reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance;332 second, that the promise did really
induce such action or forbearance;333 and third, that one party suffered detriment as a
consequence.334 Some other elements might be very useful to show and required, like the
foreseeability by the promisor that the promisee would rely on the promise.335 It is also necessary
to show that the promisee relied on the promise of a “definite and substantial nature.”336
However, it is important to note that, according to Miller v. Lawlor,337 a promissory estoppel
claim is not subject to the requirement of a false representation or concealment of material facts,
or the absence of knowledge of the true facts by the promisee because the reliance is on the
promise and not on a misrepresentation of facts.338
Following all these requirements for a promissory estoppel claim, it appears that such a cause of
action “demands a promise involving commitment, or the manifestation of an intention to act or
refrain from acting in a specified way.”339 Moreover, the promise that the promisee relied upon
must be clear and unambiguous.340 It has been said that the promise must be clear and
sufficiently specific in such a way that the obligations agreed by the parties can be understood
and enforced according to its terms by a court.341 In other words, if in a course of dealings the
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parties agreed to the terms of their promise in such a way that leaves the court able to identify
their respective obligations, a promissory estoppel cause of action can be brought. Therefore, it
would be difficult to identify the obligations of the parties since they are still negotiating and in
theory they have yet to agree about the terms of their agreements. Thus, if the parties drafted a
preliminary document, such as a letter of intent, a promissory estoppel claim cannot be brought
before a court. It has to be a promise that is clear and definite. In addition, the court in Wright v.
Miller342 asserted that a “statement of future intent is not the unequivocal promise necessary to
invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel.”343 Of course in a case of a conditional oral promise,
a promissory estoppel cause of action cannot be brought because it is not reasonable for the party
to rely on such a promise.344
In order to know whether a promissory estoppel claim can be successful and whether
enforcement of a promise is necessary to avoid injustice, it may depend on the reasonableness of
the promisee’s reliance,345
on its definite and substantial character in relation to the remedy sought, on the
formality with which the promise is made, on the extent to which the
evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and channeling functions of form are met by
the commercial setting or otherwise, and on the extent to which such other
policies as the enforcement of bargains and the prevention of unjust enrichment
are relevant.346
It seems that when a promise is made during the negotiation period, and the promise is not clear
enough in such a way that there is no liability involved for the parties, promissory estoppel
cannot operate to create liability where it does not otherwise exist.347
342

93 Wash. App. 189 (1999).
Id. at 202.
344
G & F Associates Co. v. Brookhaven Beach Health Related Facility, 671 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
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There are some situations that occur during preliminary negotiations in which the parties
understand that no contract has yet been formed and certain terms are left to be agreed upon.
Such situations may be called as pre-contractual reliance.348 In order to allow a reliance recovery
in such cases on the basis of promissory estoppel, a court immediately confronts the rule that the
promise upon which the promisee relied on must be “clear and definite.”349 In the preliminary
negotiations context, the well-known case Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.350 is important to
analyze.351 Hoffman and his wife, as plaintiffs in this case, relied on several assurances by
authorized agents of Red Owl Stores, the defendant. The parties were negotiating. A contract
about these assurances was supposed to be drafted and signed but it was never been formed.
Instead of focusing upon the fact of the parties envisioned a bargain but never achieved one, or
that the preliminary negotiations had not reached an adequate level of definiteness to constitute
an offer, the court instead focused on the idea of fairness and equity and how to avoid manifest
injustice caused by detrimental reliance. The reliance in this case was not only foreseen by the
promisors but also urged upon the promisees. Here again, there is the idea of fairness and equity
in transactions, whether a contract is reached at the end or not. Indeed, in Hoffman, no written
agreement on the essential factors had been reached. The court asserted that if promissory
estoppel were limited to only those situations where the promise giving rise to the cause of action
must be so definite with respect to all details that a contract would result, then the defendant’s
348

MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS: §66 DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE – “PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL.” 1.
PRECONTRACTUAL RELIANCE – INDEFINITENESS – ABSENCE OF OFFER, 324 (Fourth Edition 2001).
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133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
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Id. The facts summarized are the following: Lukowitz, agent for Red Owl, represented to and agreed with
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promises at issue would not meet this test.352 To resolve this issue the court referred to
Restatement First of Contracts §90,353 which does not require that the “promise giving rise to the
cause of action must be so comprehensive in scope as to meet the requirement of an offer that
would ripen into a contract if accepted by the promisee.”354 Thus, it would be an error to analyze
an action on the ground of promissory estoppel as equivalent to an action for breach of
contract.355 In addition, the use of this theory in pre-agreement negotiations is bound to alter the
well-known scheme of offer and acceptance because it imposes responsibility without regard to
expressed intention.356 Besides, the use of this doctrine in pre-agreement bargaining is
“inconsistent with a line of authority that maintains that pre-agreement discussions and
negotiations can at most constitute an agreement to agree, which is not generally enforceable.” It
appears very difficult to know whether a promissory estoppel cause of action can be brought
when the parties are in the negotiating process and reached a pre-agreement. It seems that it
would depend on whether the promise upon which the promisee relied on is definite and
substantive enough to warrant the remedy of promissory estoppel. It seems very difficult in the
negotiation process to recognize such a promise as binding if not all the essential terms of the
parties’ agreement are decided and agreed upon. Courts will have to look at the intention of the
parties as well as the language used in their documents.357 In addition, whether the promissory
352
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RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §90: PROMISE REASONABLY INDUCING DEFINITE AND SUBSTANTIAL
ACTION. “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance of a definite and
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estoppel claim can be brought really depends on the circumstances, which are different in each
case. The fact that the promise is definite remains of great importance for a court in order to give
an appropriate remedy. In another well-known case, Wheeler v. White,358 the court of appeals
found that the agreement between the parties was too indefinite to enforce.359 The Supreme
Court of Texas held that the agreement could not qualify as a contract because of its
indefiniteness. However, the promissory estoppel cause of action was appropriate because the
plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s assurances was justified. This case shows again that the
original point of promissory estoppel was to give appropriate remedy for contract-like promises
and then enable the courts to enforce these kinds of promises made unenforceable by technical
defects or defenses.360 Moreover, in Pop’s Cones, Inc. v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc.,361 the
court indicated that the requirement of a “clear and definite” promise should be relaxed in
situations where the plaintiff seeks to enforce an agreement not fully negotiated.362 The court
indicated that Restatement Second of Contracts §90 should be understood as not requiring a
“strict adherence to proof of a ‘clear and definite promise’ which is being eroded by a more
equitable analysis designed to avoid injustice.”363 However, the position of courts on this is not
unanimous. Some agree that a promissory estoppel cause of action can be brought even if not all
“the language inserted in a draft of the agreement has to be strong (though not conclusive) evidence of intent not to
be bound prior to execution.” However in this case the cause of action for breach of contract was dismissed because
the parties were not contractually bound until the draft agreement was executed, thus the plaintiff has a right to
recover on a theory of promissory estoppel.
358
398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965), the facts can be summarized as follow: the defendant promised to procure
construction financing for the shopping center. The defendant failed to furnish such financing himself. Thus because
the plaintiff relied on the defendant’s promise, he proceeded to reconstruct the sit for the new center by tearing down
existing structures. Thus, because of the non performance of the defendant, the plaintiff sought damages on the basis
of the agreement between him and the defendant. See also for a description of the facts MURRAY, MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS, §66. DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE – “PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL”. C. APPLICATION AND EXPANSION OF
DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE. 1. PRECONTRACTUAL RELIANCE – INDEFINITENESS – ABSENCE OF OFFER, 325 (Fourth
Edition 2001).
359
Id. Wheeler at 97
360
Doe v. Univision Television Group., Inc., 717 So. 2d 63 (Oct 1, 1998).
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704 A.2d 1321 at 1325 (1998).
362
Id. at 1325
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Id. at 1326.
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essential elements of a contract are met,364 whereas some others require that all these elements
are met to invoke promissory estoppel.365
Concerning the allowance of damages, the court indicated that usually the plaintiff should
be placed in the position he would have been in if he had not acted in reliance on the promise.366
Usually the recovery for breach of a contract promise is under the expectation interest.367 Under
this rule, the plaintiff will be placed in the same financial position in which he would have been
placed if he had the promisor performed.368 Damages for a promissory estoppel claim are not the
price agreed to be paid on full performance.369 However, when the action is based on promissory
estoppel ground, the loss or injury will be measured based on reliance damages.370 Indeed,
reliance damages may be the most appropriate remedy in a case where a party has changed his
position in reliance on the contract by incurring expenses in order to prepare to perform the said
promise.371 In fact, when a promise is broken on the grounds of promissory estoppel, the
appropriate remedy is to allow reliance damages which are measured according to the loss.372
In French law, the concept of promissory estoppel does not exist. A similar concept is the
“théorie de l’apparence” which applies if one party relied on the other’s acts because the other
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preparation for performance, or in performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable
certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.”

67

party let him believe that he has the right to conclude such an agreement.373 Under this theory,
the “apparence” has to be well-known, persistent, non equivocal, and based on common mistake
(“error communis facit jus”), that is to say, it is shared by almost everyone and as a result is
unavoidable. The plaintiff has to show these elements of “apparence” and also its legitimacy.374
Nevertheless, this kind of action is not very often used in preliminary negotiations but rather in
agency contracts.
Indeed, an action for breach of negotiations can be brought before a court and the
responsibility of the party who wrongfully breached the negotiations will be under tort law.
According to article 1382 of the French Civil Code, any injury which is caused to one person by
another must be redressed by the person by whom this injury occurred.375

II- Unjust enrichment (quasi contract or restitution)
The issue of pre-contractual services is a difficult one. The concept of unjust enrichment
is based in the law of restitution in both American and French law. Unjust enrichment means that
“for this by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer through another’s loss.”376 Unjust
enrichment has to be distinguished from the two principal sources of civil liability at common
law: tort and contract.377 In fact, American law has recognized that unjust enrichment constitutes
373

See B. MERCADAL AND P.MACQUERON, LE DROIT DES AFFAIRES EN FRANCE [BUSINESS LAW IN FRANCE],
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a complete distinguishable category of law.378 Another term sometimes used for this doctrine is
“restitution.” Nevertheless, restitution is often used to designate any kind of remedy at law or in
equity that redresses unjust enrichment.379 According to Puttkammer v. Minth,380 an action for
recovery grounded under unjust enrichment is based on the “moral principle that one who has
received a benefit has a duty to make restitution where retaining such a benefit would be
unjust.”381
According to Restatement of Restitution §1 (1937), when a person has been unjustly
enriched at another’s detriment, he has the duty to make restitution to that person.382 The unjust
enrichment claim permits one party to seek reimbursement from another who benefited from his
or her action (or property) without legal right. According to Sparks v. Gustafson,383 unjust
enrichment exists where the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff and as a matter of
equity the defendant has to compensate the plaintiff for its value.384 The plaintiff is entitled to
compensation when the defendant has conferred a benefit upon him if it would be fair, just and
equitable to require compensation under the circumstances.385 A benefit is constituted by the
giving to another person some interest in money, land or possessions, or is when one performs
tends to disappear. He said that “contract is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of tort.” Furthermore, he indicates
that it has been noticed “the insistence of the classical theorists on the sharp differentiation between contract and tort
– the [early] refusal to admit any liability in “contract” until the formal requisites of offer, acceptance and
consideration had been satisfied, the dogma that only “bargained-for” detriment or benefit could count as
consideration, and notably, the limitations on damage recovery… With the growth of the promissory estoppel idea,
it was breached on the detriment side. We are fast approaching the point where, to prevent unjust enrichment, any
benefit received by a defendant must be paid for unless it was clearly meant as a gift; where any detriment,
reasonably incurred by a plaintiff in reliance on the defendant’s assurances must be recompensed. When that point is
reached, there is really no longer any viable distinction between liability in contract and liability in tort.”
378
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379
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services beneficial to the other, or satisfies a debt of the other. In sum, gives a benefit to
another.386
Three conditions must be met in order to show “unjust enrichment:”387 first of all, the
defendant is enriched or has a benefit; second, the plaintiff has been deprived because of the
defendant’s enrichment (and the defendant had the knowledge of the benefit);388 third and
finally, the defendant has no legal reason to be enriched at the plaintiff expense.389 Even if it is
the case that someone confers a benefit upon another not required by contract or legal duty, the
party who received that benefit is often unjustly enriched and therefore restitution of that benefit
(or at least its value) is required.390 However, this is not always the case. Indeed, the distinction
between unjust enrichment and a mere gratuity remains very important. Of course, a gift is not
considered as enrichment for the person who received it.
The first principle is that one who has given a benefit upon another with the intention to
make a gift cannot seek relief afterwards against the person who received the benefit.391 Such a
principle is valid in absence of fraud, mistake, duress or undue influence.392 Therefore, relief
would not be granted for a gift. However, such situations are very difficult to find when
preliminary negotiations are involved as a mere gratuity is rarely given when parties are dealing.
The second principle of unjust enrichment is that one who confers an advantage upon
another without affording the other one the opportunity to refuse and reject the benefit, that
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person has no equitable claim for relief against the other who received the benefit.393 This would
be considered as an invasion of someone’s own affairs. Besides, courts refer to the free choice
principle in terms of intermeddlers.394 An intermeddler is someone who imposed or conferred a
benefit upon someone else against his will, or deprives him of choice in the matter.395 If during
the negotiations, when no contract is signed, one party has been unjustly enriched at another’s
expense and suffered a detriment as a result, the injured party can bring a suit under the unjust
enrichment theory. That party will recover under the restitution theory. Indeed, restitution theory
may refer to only one kind of remedy that one party seeks for breach of contract.396
Unjust enrichment theory refers also to the notion of quasi-contract, or a contract implied
in law,397 as the court indicates in Bloomgarden v. Coyer.398 In fact, during the negotiations
period most of the time no contract has been reached but some duties are still thrust upon the
parties under some certain circumstances. According to Bloomgarden, this occurs when there is a
quasi-contract which is “not a contract at all, but a duty thrust under certain conditions upon one
party to require another in order to avoid the former’s unjust enrichment.”399 Thus, it can be so in
preliminary negotiations when one party acts in reliance upon another without any
compensation, and that party is deprived whereas the other one is unjustly enriched. This would
be the case if, for example, some money was paid during the negotiations.
This notion of quasi-contract dates back many years and has been developed by the
common law in situations where no contract was made but one party has been enriched at
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another’s expense.400 In preliminary negotiations the parties can truly believe that there was a
contract between them but that they had not reached a mutual assent yet. In such a case, the
common law gives the plaintiff a remedy and will ask for restitution damages under the theory of
quasi-contract. Indeed, in order to recover under a quasi-contractual claim, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant was unjustly enriched at his expense, and that the circumstances were
such that in good conscience the defendant should make restitution. According to Anderson v.
Schwegel,401 in such situations the plaintiff is still entitled to recover the reasonable value of all
services, materials or others, of what the defendant has benefited “as measured by the reasonable
value of the benefit conferred.”402 Thus, a quasi-contract will be recognized in appropriate
circumstance even if no intention of the parties to bind themselves contractually can be
discerned.403
Furthermore, the notion of contract implied in law is also used to designate the unjust
enrichment theory.404 Under this notion, there are two different categories: contract implied-infact and contract implied-in-law. A contract implied-in-fact is a real and true contract which
contains all necessary elements of an enforceable agreement but which differs from other
contracts in that it has not been committed to writing or stated orally in express terms, but it
inferred from the conduct of the parties.405 Some elements have to be shown in order to prove the
existence of an implied-in-fact contract. They include establishing that the goods or services
were given or performed for the defendant, were not rendered gratuitously, and did actually
400
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benefit the defendant.406 In contrast, a contract implied in law refers to obligations arising under
the theory of unjust enrichment when no agreement was made in fact.407
The notion of unjust enrichment or “enrichissement sans cause” is quite similar in
French law. This notion can be translated as “unjustified enrichment.” However, French law
adopts a more rigid formulation than American law. Indeed, “enrichissement sans cause” is used
where other remedies are not effective. Therefore, the “enrichissement sans cause” theory has a
subsidiary character, that is to say, the plaintiff has to consider possible actions in contract and
tort before thinking of bringing a claim under “enrichissement sans cause.” The parties, as it is in
American law, have to show that the plaintiff’s loss is the direct consequence of the defendant’s
enrichment, and that gain is made without any cause or justification.408 The origin of this notion
is found in case law and not in the French Civil Code. This principle of “enrichissement sans
cause” was recognized for the first time by the French Cour de Cassation in 1892, but since then
French law has confined this notion to a residual role.409 In the eighteenth century, two wellknown authors in France, Domat and Pothier, were influential in the actions of “condictio
indebiti”410 and “negotiorum gestio”411 which are recognized under the title of quasi-contracts in
articles 1371 to 1381 of the French Civil Code, and lead afterwards to the known doctrine of
unjust enrichment.
406
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The leading case in this field is L’Affaire Boudier,412 in which Boudier sold fertilizer to a
tenant for use on his land. The tenant failed to fulfill the conditions of his tenancy agreement and
consequently, in partial discharge of the debt, his landlord had seized the crop on which the
fertilizer had been applied and repossessed the property. Accordingly, Boudier brought an action
de “in rem verso” in order to recover the purchase price from the landlord that was left unpaid.
The landlord’s counter argument was that this recovery action would breach the principle of
article 1165 of the French Civil Code,413 which provides for the privacy of contract.414 However,
this argument was rejected by the French Cour de Cassation, which asserted that the plaintiff’s
cause of action “lay not in contract but on a principle of equity, triggered by the personal and
direct profit gained from the use of Boudier’s fertilizer. This action derives from a principle of
equity, which prohibits an individual from enriching himself at the expense of another. It is not
set out in any statutory provision and it is not subject to any specified conditions. To bring a
successful action, it will suffice that the claimant allege as and proves the existence of a benefit,
which was, by an act or omission, transferred to the defendant.”415 After this famous case, one
method of limitation was to absorb the theory within the action of either contract or tort.416
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Some authors rely on the tort liability or “responsabilité délictuelle” provided by article
1382 of the French Civil Code.417 In fact, the common element of compensation for unintentional
harm in quasi-delict and enrichissement sans cause is that no one can harm another without a
legal justification.418 Other commentators rely on the objective theory of risk,419 which says in
sum that if there is a link between the plaintiff’s loss and the defendant’s benefit, the defendant
shall be held responsible.420 Thus, it seems that if there is a just cause of the plaintiff’s loss, then
the defendant has not been enriched. However, the principle established in the Boudier’s case
stated that “nul ne peut s’enrichir aux dépens d’autrui” still stands.421 It seems that courts focus
on equity. Later on in the Clayette’s case,422 the Cour de Cassation affirmed that the remedy of
unjust enrichment has to be seen as a subsidiary remedy.423 All these cases, plus the Briauhant’s
case,424 held that any claim for unjust enrichment would be subsidiary to a claim in contract or
tort.425
Under the French law of “enrichissement sans cause,” the plaintiff must show that the
five elements are met. Indeed, this principle of “enrichissement sans cause” did not lead French
law to grant recovery for every unauthorized gain.426 Five elements must be shown under this
principle:427 first, the defendant received a benefit; second, the plaintiff suffered a loss as a
result; third, the gain received was without justification or “sans cause;” fourth, the plaintiff did
417
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419
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not act in his own interest; and finally, the plaintiff had no alternative cause of action.428 Indeed,
if the defendant can justify his enrichment, there is no legal ground for an action. It seems that
French law categorization is stricter than American law since each of these elements has to be
shown in order to recover from the loss. Some authors assert that in order to have a successful
claim under “enrichissement sans cause,” the plaintiff must be show that the situation of the
parties is absent of fraud,429 but this is not always the case. It is important to note that the final
requirement, that the plaintiff must not have acted in his own interest or at his own risk, is quite
related to the question of fault. Indeed, courts will not analyze claims which involve a situation
where unjust enrichment was clearly a result of one party’s own interest.430
According to these elements, it seems that a party can bring a suit for unjust enrichment
in a case of pre-contractual relations between the parties. This could occur when one party starts
to perform a contract which has not been yet formed by purchasing some material, and as a result
the other party is enriched by the purchase. In most cases, such a performance in anticipation of a
contract will be analyzed as implicit acceptance of the risks involved.431 It seems logical that in
the negotiation process some risk remains that the work will not be completed or that some
incidents might occur. It seems that, from the point of view of some authors,432 in case of
misconduct at the pre-contractual stage, a party can have a suit under tort responsibility even if
an insufficient meeting of minds or “accord de volontés” exists to constitute an agreement.
428
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Thus, it has been said that at the stage of pre-contractual negotiations when a contract is not
complete enough to provide remedy under contract law, the appropriate remedy is under tort
law.433 Here, according to these authors, unjust enrichment would not be an appropriate
remedy.434

433

Id. Professor Schmidt-Szalewski cites that “as long as a contract has not been concluded, compensation of any
damage occurred during the pre-contractual process may only be treated in torts.”
434
See PAULA GILIKER, PRE-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW, 101, (Kluwer Law
International 2002) which indicates that such considerations “bar the intervention of enrichissement sans cause and
provide a compromise with freedom of contract.”
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CONCLUSION

Despite their differences, American law and French law reached the same result at the
end regarding pre-contractual liability. While American law emphasized reliance, promissory
estoppel or unjust enrichment theory as the valid bases for a pre-contractual liability cause of
action, French law based its action on tort responsibility for lack of good faith. Nevertheless, the
question of liability arising during the period of negotiations is and will always be problematic.
Indeed, both the American law and French law of pre-contractual obligations do not fit within
the traditional framework of the law of contract or obligations. As seen before, French law does
not contain any regulations in its Civil Code regarding this subject matter. Thus, liability will be
in tort, or “responsabilité délictuelle,” of article 1382 of the French Civil Code. French law
refers to the principle of good faith or “bonne foi” in negotiations.
Furthermore, as seen in chapter one of this study, preliminary negotiations have to be
distinguished from final contracts. This first part studied cases in which a contract is reached at
the end of the dealing process. Preliminary negotiations do not constitute a contract even if they
preclude the existence of one later on in the dealing process. Parties are free to contract and free
to withdraw at will but they also have to understand the deal: during negotiations there is a risk
that the agreement will not be concluded. Negotiations by their nature are uncertain, thus this
risk is part of the game. Even though parties have to be aware, it remains that most of the time, if
not all the time, obligations are imposed upon one party to disclose, to take reasonable care and
not to mislead the other. These legal duties could also be the legal ground for a cause of action
when there is misrepresentation. Nevertheless, in a lawsuit, when one party is trying to prove that
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the other misled as to the facts, courts will refuse to resurrect some preliminary contracts,
documents, written or oral, in accordance with the parol evidence rule. Sometimes, however,
courts will allow some documents (letters, telex, etc) as evidence when the contract between the
parties is ambiguous and the real intent of the parties must be found. That is the reason why most
of the time the parties prefer to protect themselves by including a merger clause in their writing.
In the second chapter, the problem when a preliminary agreement is made but a formal
contract is only contemplated but never executed. The situation remains difficult to resolve in
both the American law and French law of obligations. First of all, in both legal systems the
parties have to negotiate in good faith and with fair dealing. This implies that they cannot
wrongfully breach the negotiations. Even though preliminary negotiations do not constitute a
contract, in some cases, binding agreements can be made during this pre-contractual period.
Thus, the parties may want to include a condition precedent or “condition suspensive” in their
contract in order to regulate obligations arising from the written document until the condition
cited comes to realization. Moreover, the parties may want to include essential terms that they
agreed upon in their agreement. In a lawsuit, courts will analyze any document between the
parties. After what the parties agreed upon as essential terms of their agreement is decided, there
is greater chance that courts will recognize it as a binding contract. It seems that the closer the
elements of a writing are to those of a contract, the greater chance courts will hold it enforceable.
In addition, the parties may want to have an agreement to reduce their contract to writing or to
make it more formal. Drafting a letter of intent remains the best way to protect parties because
they can decide whether they want it to be contractually binding or not. They should be clear in
their letter of intent in order to avoid a misinterpretation by courts. However, when the parties do
not indicate their intent to be bound, courts will interpret the intent of the parties in light of the
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words stated in their documents and the circumstances surrounding the signature of the letter of
intent. Most of the time in American law a letter of intent will be recognized as an enforceable
document when it contains all the essential terms necessary to constitute a valid contract and, of
course, is supported by valid consideration. It is the same in French law except that there is no
requirement of valid consideration.
In the third and final part, liability under contract law is almost impossible to find when
the parties are dealing but have not yet reached an agreement. In some cases, however, when one
party relies on another’s words and acts, and when this reliance causes a detriment to the person
who relied, courts may allow a remedy under promissory estoppel. This system exists only in
American contract law, not in French contract law. However, French law will use tort liability or
“responsabilité délictuelle” in such cases. Furthermore, if one party has been unjustly enriched
at another’s loss, the injured party could bring a claim under the unjust enrichment theory and
recover for the loss. This theory is also adopted by French law. Nevertheless, French law prefers
to analyze pre-contractual obligations when no agreement is reached under tort liability.
Risk in negotiations is an important factor to take into account. Understanding that
negotiations involve inevitable risk and that parties are free to contract means that no
responsibility could be issued. Therefore, the proper question to ask is whether a contract is
formed between the parties at the end of the negotiation process. If a contract is formed, courts
will focus on the contract to understand the relations and obligations between the parties. In case
of ambiguity, the court may analyze other evidence. If no contract is formed, the obligations
between the parties have to be treated under tort law according to French law, and under
promissory estoppel or unjust enrichment according to American law. Damages will therefore be
allowed under these theories. Accordingly, the parties should definitely draft at least one
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document which will summarize their dealings and obligations. By doing this they will protect
themselves from any misunderstanding and unexpected consequences.
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